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Abstract
Recent studies have provided solid evidence for pure cases of prosopagnosia
following brain damage. The patients reported so far have posterior lesions
encompassing either or both the right inferior occipital cortex and fusiform gyrus,
and exhibit a critical impairment in generating a sufficiently detailed holistic
percept to individualize faces. Here, we extended these observations to include
the prosopagnosic patient LR (Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006), whose
damage is restricted to the anterior region of the right temporal lobe. First, we
report that LR is able to discriminate parametrically defined individual exemplars
of nonface object categories as accurately and quickly as typical observers, which
suggests that the visual similarity account of prosopagnosia does not explain
his impairments. Then, we show that LR does not present with the typical face
inversion effect, whole-part advantage, or composite face effect and, therefore,
has impaired holistic perception of indivi...
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a b s t r a c t
Recent studies have provided solid evidence for pure cases of prosopagnosia following brain damage.
The patients reported so far have posterior lesions encompassing either or both the right inferior occipital
cortex and fusiform gyrus, and exhibit a critical impairment in generating a sufﬁciently detailed holistic
percept to individualize faces. Here, we extended these observations to include the prosopagnosic patient LR
(Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006), whose damage is restricted to the anterior region of the right
temporal lobe. First, we report that LR is able to discriminate parametrically deﬁned individual exemplars of
nonface object categories as accurately and quickly as typical observers, which suggests that the visual
similarity account of prosopagnosia does not explain his impairments. Then, we show that LR does not
present with the typical face inversion effect, whole-part advantage, or composite face effect and, therefore,
has impaired holistic perception of individual faces. Moreover, the patient is more impaired at matching
faces when the facial part he ﬁxates is masked than when it is selectively revealed by means of gaze
contingency. Altogether these observations support the view that the nature of the critical face impairment
does not differ qualitatively across patients with acquired prosopagnosia, regardless of the localization of
brain damage: all these patients appear to be impaired to some extent at what constitutes the heart of our
visual expertise with faces, namely holistic perception at a sufﬁciently ﬁne-grained level of resolution to
discriminate exemplars of the face class efﬁciently. This conclusion raises issues regarding the existing
criteria for diagnosis/classiﬁcation of patients as cases of apperceptive or associative prosopagnosia.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Apperceptive and associative prosopagnosia
For most of us, recognizing a friend by his/her face is so easy
and natural that we are usually unaware of the complexity of the
operations at play during face recognition, a function that has been
the topic of many investigations in experimental (neuro)psychol-
ogy over the past decades (Calder, Rhodes, Johnson, & Haxby,
2011; Bruce & Young, 2012). Traditionally, experimental psychol-
ogists and cognitive neuropsychologists have divided the process
of face recognition into several sub-functions or sub-processes
(Bruce & Young, 1986). These processes are thought to be carried
out by distinct brain structures, organized in a network (e.g.,
Sergent, Otha, & MacDonald, 1992; Allison, Puce, Spencer, & McCarthy,
1999; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Gobbini & Haxby,
2007; Fox, Iaria, & Barton, 2009; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2010;
Rossion, Hanseeuw, & Dricot, 2012; Pyles, Verstynen, Schneider, &
Tarr, 2013).
A major distinction in the ﬁeld is made between the perceptual
and mnesic aspects of face recognition. For instance, several
authors have applied the apperceptive/associative classiﬁcation
of visual agnosia, called “psychic blindness” by Lissauer (1890), to
the domain of faces (De Renzi, 1986; De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, &
Nichelli, 1991; Sergent & Signoret, 1992a, 1992b; Barton, 2003).
These authors argued that there are at least two separate forms of
the inability to recognize faces following brain damage: an
apperceptive and an associative form of prosopagnosia. Patients
with apperceptive prosopagnosia are unable to perceive faces
properly, while patients with associative prosopagnosia are unable
to associate a correct percept of a face with stored memories about
this face. Apperceptive prosopagnosia has been linked to posterior
occipito-temporal lesions, whereas associative prosopagnosia has
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been associated with lesions of the anterior part of the temporal
lobe, in particular in the right hemisphere (Gross & Sergent, 1992;
Sergent & Signoret, 1992b; Barton, Cherkasova, & Hefter, 2004;
Pancaroglu et al. 2011).
The vast majority of impairments in face recognition following
damage to the anterior temporal lobe has been reported in the
context of neurodegenerative diseases, such as the right temporal
variant of frontotemporal dementia (Tyrrell, Warrington,
Frackowiak, & Rossor, 1990; Barbarotto, Capitani, Spinnler, &
Trivelli, 1995; Evans, Heggs, Antoun, & Hodges, 1995; Gentileschi,
Sperber, & Spinnler, 1999, 2001; Gainotti, Barbier, & Marra, 2003;
Gainotti, Ferraccioli, Quaranta, & Marra, 2008; Gorno-Tempini
et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2004; Joubert et al., 2006; Busigny,
Robaye, Dricot, & Rossion, 2009). However, these patients are
usually also impaired in recognizing individuals by their names
and voices. Since face recognition impairment is only one symp-
tom of (somewhat diffuse) damage in the anterior temporal lobe,
it might be more appropriate to characterize these patients as
having “multimodal person recognition disorder” rather than
“associative prosopagnosia” (Gainotti, 2013).
More rarely, sudden focal brain damage to the anterior tem-
poral lobe due to herpes simplex encephalitis (Warrington &
McCarthy, 1988; Hanley, Young, & Pearson, 1989; Sergent &
Poncet, 1990; Haslam, Cook, & Coltheart, 2001; Barton, Hanif, &
Ashraf, 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2011; Pancaroglu et al., 2011),
closed head injury (Kapur, Ellison, Smith, McLellan, & Burrows,
1992; Barton, Zhao, & Keenan, 2003), or following anterior
temporal lobe resection in the context of epileptic seizures
resistant to medication (Ellis, Young, & Critchley, 1989; Tippett,
Miller, & Farah, 2000; Glosser, Salvucci, & Chiaravalloti, 2003;
Chiaravalloti & Glosser, 2004; Drane et al., 2008; Pancaroglu,
Johnston, Sekunova, Duchaine, & Barton, 2012) (see Table 1) can
all result in impairments in face recognition. However, the
majority of these patients are also impaired at recognizing
individuals by their names and voices.
1.2. Perceptual impairment in associative prosopagnosia
The studies listed above suggest that patients with right
anterior temporal lobe damage are impaired at memorizing
new faces, identifying familiar faces and retrieving semantic
information about familiar faces. In general, these patients have
been reported as being unimpaired in face perception, i.e., the
ability to build a proper visual representation – an internal image
– of a face. For instance, most patients were able to match
simultaneously presented pictures of unfamiliar faces, as in the
Benton Face Recognition Test (BFRT, Benton & van Allen, 1968) or
similar tests (Warrington & McCarthy, 1988; Ellis et al., 1989;
Hanley et al., 1989; Sergent & Poncet, 1990; Kapur et al., 1992;
Tippet et al., 2000; Haslam et al., 2001; Glosser et al., 2003;
Chiaravalloti & Glosser, 2004; Barton et al., 2009; Dalrymple et al.,
2011; see Table 1). However, importantly, with the exception of a
single-patient study (Sergent & Poncet, 1990), response times were
never reported. Consequently, whether these patients relied on a
slow feature-by-feature strategy to match faces, as reported in
many cases of prosopagnosia with face perception impairment (e.
g. Newcombe, 1979; McNeil & Warrington, 1991; Young, Flude,
Hay, & Ellis, 1993; Mattson, Levin, & Grafman, 2000; Rossion et al.,
2003; Delvenne, Seron, Coyette, & Rossion, 2004), remains
unknown. Moreover, there are good reasons to doubt that percep-
tion of faces is intact in these patients. In a review of 99 cases of
associative visual agnosia, Farah (1990/2004) reported that most
patients characterized as being of the ‘associative’ form were
abnormally sensitive to the visual quality of the stimuli, and
performed poorly when recognizing line drawing stimuli or
stimuli presented tachistoscopically. Most of these patients' recog-
nition errors were visual in nature. When patients did copy
drawings reasonably well, they were described as using a “slavish,
line-by-line, and piecemeal” strategy (Farah, 1990/2004, p. 74).
Although these observations concern object rather than face
recognition, they raise issues around the diagnosis criteria of a
purely associative form of prosopagnosia.
1.3. Nature of the perceptual impairment in apperceptive
prosopagnosia
There is now converging evidence supporting the view that
patients with acquired apperceptive prosopagnosia present with
impaired conﬁgural/holistic face perception (for a review see
Busigny, Joubert, Felician, Ceccaldi, & Rossion, 2010a). While their
perception of face parts is relatively well preserved, these patients
seem unable to integrate these different parts into a single, uniﬁed
Table 1
Face perception results of patients reported with anterior temporal lesions and presenting with face recognition difﬁculties.
Patient Etiology Face perception Results
RFR (Warrington & McCarthy, 1988) HSE OK 18/20 (same/diff matching task)
BD (Hanley et al., 1989) HSE OK 46/54 (BFRT)
PV (Sergent & Poncet, 1990) HSE OK 46/54, 6min21 (BFRT)
TG (Haslam et al., 2001) HSE OK 43/54 (BFRT)
B-AT1 (Barton et al., 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2011) HSE OK 45/54 (BFRT) 100% (same/diff discrimination, FAB) 48% of
errors (CFPT, mean¼36.7; SD¼12.2)
R-AT2 (Barton et al., 2009) HSE OK 47/54 (BFRT) 90% (same/diff discrimination, FAB) 40% of
errors (CFPT, mean¼36.7; SD¼12.2)
LT (Kapur et al., 1992) CHI OK Preserved (BFRT)
TS/008 (Barton et al., 2003; Barton, 2008) CHI impaired 24/54 (BFRT) No face geometry effect
KS (Ellis et al., 1989) RATL OK 45/54 (BFRT)
CT (Tippett et al., 2000) RATL OK 43/54 (BFRT) 91% (1581 ms) upright faces 78% (1641 ms)
inverted faces Normal performanceþnormal FIE
R-AT1 (Barton et al., 2009) RATL OK 41/54 (BFRT) 58% of errors (CFPT, mean¼36.7; SD¼12.2)
26 patients (Glosser et al., 2003) RATL OK Z¼#0.71 (0,22) (BFRT) compared to controls
38 patients (Chiaravalloti & Glosser, 2004) RATL OK 744/54 (before surgery) (BFRT) 743/54 (after surgery)
(BFRT)
HSE¼Herpes Simplex Encephalitis.
CHI¼Closed Head Injury.
ATL¼Right Anterior Temporal Lobectomy.
BFRT¼Benton Face Recognition Test (Benton & Van Allen, 1968).
FAB¼Florida Affect Battery (Bowers et al., 1991).
CFPT¼California Face Perception Test (Duchaine et al., 2007).
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representation (Davidoff, Matthews, & Newcombe, 1986; Levine &
Calvanio, 1989; Sergent & Villemure, 1989; Spillmann, Laskowski,
Lange, Kasper, & Schmidt, 2000; Saumier, Arguin, & Lassonde,
2001; Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Barton, Press, Keenan, &
O’Connor, 2002; Barton, 2008; Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell,
Boutsen, & Humphreys, 2008; Wilkinson et al., 2009; Busigny
et al., 2010a; Ramon, Busigny, & Rossion, 2010).
A wide variety of methodological paradigms have been used to
test holistic/conﬁgural face perception in prosopagnosia. In most
studies, the patients tested were also impaired at object recogni-
tion (e.g., Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Levine & Calvanio, 1989).
More recently, classical paradigms developed for testing holistic/
conﬁgural face perception in the normal population have been
used to assess patients with intact object recognition (‘pure
prosopagnosia’). More speciﬁcally, impairment in holistic percep-
tion was evidenced in prosopagnosia by the absence or reduction
of the face inversion effect (Busigny & Rossion, 2010a; Busigny
et al., 2010a), a lack of advantage in processing parts embedded in
whole faces as compared to isolated parts (Busigny et al., 2010a;
Ramon et al., 2010) and an abnormal composite face effect
(Busigny et al., 2010a; Ramon et al., 2010). A novel approach to
understand difﬁculties in holistic perception of individual faces
has also been developed using gaze-contingency (Van Belle, de
Graef, Verfaillie, Busigny, & Rossion, 2010a; Van Belle et al., 2011), a
method traditionally used to investigate the perceptual span in
reading by selectively revealing/masking a portion of the visual
ﬁeld (Rayner, 1998). Introducing this approach in face perception
research, Van Belle et al. (2010a, 2011) showed that the perfor-
mance pattern of patients with acquired prosopagnosia in a face
matching task was reversed in comparison to normal observers.
That is, compared to their performance with faces presented in full
view, the patients showed almost no decrease in performance
when only one facial part (eye, mouth, nose, etc.) was available at
a time (forcing part-based analysis). In contrast, when the ﬁxated
part was selectively masked (promoting holistic perception)
patients showed an increased impairment.
Altogether, these observations support a generalized account of
acquired prosopagnosia in which the critical impairment concerns
holistic perception of an individual face. Among all visual categories,
faces would be the only one for which ﬁne-grained differentiation
(i.e., individualization) would require holistic perception. This
would lead to the observation of rare cases of pure prosopagnosia
following brain damage (Busigny et al., 2010a).
So far, this latter approach, as well as the other detailed
investigations testing the holistic face perception hypothesis, have
only been applied to cases of prosopagnosia presenting with clear
perceptual impairments with faces, following posterior (occipital
inferior and fusiform) brain damage. In the present study, we
tested a case of acquired prosopagnosia with damage restricted to
the right anterior temporal lobe, in order to test the hypothesis
that even in such cases there is impairment in holistic perception
of individual faces.
This hypothesis was prompted by two further observations.
First, Barton and colleagues have shown that the patient TS/008,
with bilateral anterior temporal lobe lesions (sparing the lingual
and fusiform gyri bilaterally), showed some difﬁculties in face
perception in addition to his strong impairment in face memory,
face familiarity and famous face recognition (Barton et al., 2003;
Barton, 2008). More precisely, TS was severely impaired at the
Benton Face Recognition Test (25/54) and showed reduced sensi-
tivity to the global relations between facial parts with simulta-
neously presented faces (Barton et al., 2003). Second, patient LR
(Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006), presenting with right
anterior temporal damage and memory deﬁcits for faces, also
seemed to be impaired at face perception. Although LR performed
within the normal range at the Benton Face Recognition Test
(49/54), he was described as being particularly slow, as evidenced
by a dramatically low score of 12/54 when a 17 s cutoff was
administered for each trial (Bukach et al., 2006). In addition, the
patient was impaired at extracting diagnostic information at the
level of the eyes, a characteristic shared by several cases of acquired
prosopagnosia with an impairment of perceptual nature (Caldara
et al., 2005; Busigny et al., 2010a). Bukach et al. (2006) concluded
their case study by stating that LR had preserved holistic processing
of faces, because his matching of two top halves of faces (same or
different) was inﬂuenced by the congruency (same or different) of
the bottom halves. However, this conclusion needs to be qualiﬁed
because it was based on a single test, and with only two control
participants. Moreover, the congruency paradigm used to infer
normality of holistic face processing lacked a control condition
(misaligned face halves) and presented other signiﬁcant methodo-
logical limitations (Rossion, 2013).
Here, we aimed to study holistic face perception more exten-
sively in the same patient LR. First, we made a novel assessment of
LR's recognition impairment and its speciﬁcity to faces vs. other
familiar object categories. Speciﬁcally, we asked the patient to
discriminate exemplars of both face and nonface objects at a ﬁne-
grained level, using a series of tasks developed recently in the
context of apperceptive prosopagnosia (Busigny, Graf, Mayer, &
Rossion, 2010b). Next, we assessed LR's holistic face perception
using the following tests: face inversion, whole-part advantage
and composite face paradigms, and gaze-contingency during face
matching.
2. Methods
2.1. LR’s case description
LR is a male born in 1953 who received a head wound in a motor vehicle
accident at 19 years of age. As described in Bukach et al. (2006, 2008), LR was
thrown from the front passenger seat of a truck onto the gearshift. The gear lever
was missing the usual plastic cap covering the top, and LR received a penetrating
head wound when the hollow metal tube of the uncapped gearshift impaled his
lower left cheek in front of the jaw, passing through the left intracranial cavity and
sphenoid sinus. The shaft then entered the right cavernous sinus, clipping the right
internal carotid artery and injuring the abducens nerve and the ophthalmic and
maxillary divisions of the trigeminal nerve. It pierced the right temporal lobe,
leaving a bone fragment in the superﬁcial aspect of the middle temporal gyrus. LR
subsequently developed a right temporal intracerebral hematoma, which was
relieved through a surgeryrequiring clipping of the right internal carotid artery
(Fig. 1A). CT scans revealed ablation of the anterior and inferior sections of the right
temporal lobe affecting the amygdala, but sparing posterior regions including the
fusiform gyrus (Fig. 1B–D). As a result of the clip, LR is not able to undergo magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI). Visual acuity a year following the accident was 20/20 in
both eyes with corrective lenses, and visual ﬁelds were full. However, following the
accident, LR was no longer able to recognize faces, including highly familiar
individuals like his own daughter. To recognize people, he claims to rely primarily
on distinctive features and context.
LR performed above average on all tests of memory, object naming, reading and
perception, excluding a general cognitive disorder as a cause of his face recognition
problems (see Bukach et al., 2006). His only abnormalities were on tests involving
faces. As mentioned above, LR showed an extremely slow and feature-based
strategy when carrying out the Benton Face Recognition Test (49/54 but 55.18 s
per trial). Regarding face memory, LR obtained an impaired score of 38/50 (5th
percentile) in the Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984). When
presented with 121 photos of famous persons, he was able to provide correct
names for only 23 famous faces. In another task requiring identifying 35 famous
people from their face or their name, LR was able to correctly identify all of them by
their names by providing correct semantic information, but in contrast, he was only
able to identify 15 people from their faces (Bukach et al., 2008).
A new assessment of face processing abilities, conducted in 2010 by the authors
of the present paper, conﬁrmed LR's face recognition impairment. In a ﬁrst task, LR
recognized 13 out of 40 famous faces (of individuals from the US and UK, including
actors, singers and politicians). When provided with their names, he knew 33 out
of 40 of these faces. Excluding the 7 individuals unknown by name, his face
recognition score remains very low (13/33, or 39.4%). LR's score was signiﬁcantly
lower (Chi21¼38.34, po0.001) than his partner's (55 years old), who recognized
31 faces out of 40 (his partner knew 34 of them when provided with their names).
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In the next tasks, LR's face memory impairment was conﬁrmed by the Cambridge
Face Memory Test of Duchaine and Nakayama (2006; LR'score: 42/72; Z¼#2.01)
and on an old/new face recognition task (Busigny et al., 2010b, task 3), in which he
obtained a score of 30/50 (not different from chance; Chi2¼2, p¼0.16). Altogether,
these results clearly illustrate LR's massive impairment in face recognition.
2.2. General methodological considerations
LR was administered a set of seven behavioral tasks, including one experiment
with gaze-contingency. These experiments were conducted during three time
periods, in February 2008, May 2009, and June 2010. Ten healthy male control
participants were also tested in each experiment (7 in the last experiment with
gaze contingency), matched to LR for socio-economic background and age. Some of
the control data were collected in previous studies (Busigny, Joubert et al., 2010;
Busigny, Graf et al., 2010), and these data were included in the present study to
have ten controls for each experiment. Control participants had no history of
neurological or vascular disease, head injury or alcohol abuse, and did not have
cognitive complaints. All participants gave informed consent.
In the ﬁrst six behavioral experiments, the stimuli were presented using E-
Prime 1.1 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The patient was positioned at
about 40 cm from the screen. He was asked to provide a binary response using the
keyboard of the laptop computer. In the seventh experiment, concerning gaze-
contingency, eye movements were recorded using an SR Eyelink 1000 monocular
desktop mount, tracking the dominant (the non-dominant eye was covered).
Stimuli were displayed on a 210 0 CRT Viewsonic Graphic series G225f monitor with
a spatial resolution of 1024$768 pixels, and a temporal resolution of 75 Hz at a
distance of 62 cm.
Percentages of correct responses and response times (RTs) on correct trials
were calculated. Outlier response times were discarded when they were more than
two standard deviation of the average response time of each participant in the
condition considered.
Statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS 18.0 within the framework of
one-tailed hypothesis (0.05 p-value), except when mentioned otherwise in the text.
For intra-subject statistical analyses (conducted on patient LR), Chi-square tests
were conducted on accuracy scores and independent sample T-tests were
performed on response times. For across subject statistical analyses (conducted
on the normal controls considered as a group), paired sample t-tests were used on
accuracy rates and response times. To compare the results of LR to the control
participants, the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998) for single-case
studies was used with a 0.05 p-value within the framework of a unilateral
hypothesis, because we expected worse performance for the patient than the
controls. Consequently, for all scores associated with a p-value under 0.05, LR was
considered as being out of normal range. Analyses were conducted with a
computerized version of the Crawford & Howell's method: SINGLIMS.EXE: Point
estimate and conﬁdence limits on the abnormality of a test score (Crawford &
Garthwaite, 2002). Experiments 6 and 7 only required comparison of multiple
variables. Thus, for both intra-subject and across subject analyses we used ANOVAs.
we used ANOVAs. Furthermore, for intra-subject analyses we used a non-
parametrical bootstrapping procedure on accuracy rates. The bootstrap procedure
was done with 1000 iterations, in which N random numbers (N¼the number of
trials) were generated from a binomial distribution, with a probability distribution
equal to the accuracy in the condition under consideration. For each iteration, the
accuracy rate was calculated and sorted: the 95% conﬁdence interval corresponds
to the 25th and 975th generated accuracy rate.
3. Experiments
3.1. Is LR's Visual recognition impairment limited to faces?
3.1.1. Experiment 1. face and object discrimination at the individual
level
3.1.1.1. Material and procedure. The patient and control partici-
pants were shown individual pictures from different object
categories: birds, boats, cars, chairs and faces (the task was
originally described in Schiltz et al., 2006 and later in Busigny
et al., 2010b). In a delayed two-alternative forced choice decision
task, participants were ﬁrst presented with a target stimulus
belonging to one of the ﬁve categories for one second. Following
Fig. 1. LR's lesions located in the anterior portion of the right temporal lobe. (A) Clips, (B) Coronal view (from Bukach et al., 2006), (C) Multiple 2D transversal views and (D)
3D view created from 7 transversal views.
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a brief delay (1000 ms), they have to discriminate the target from a
distractor. The distractor belongs to the same (intra-category
discrimination, half of the trials, Fig. 2A) or to another visual
category (inter-category discrimination). To encode the response,
participants are asked to press a key corresponding to the position
of the stimulus (i.e., right-key if right-stimulus; left-key if left-
stimulus); no time constraints were applied but the participants
were instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as
possible. Photographs of faces were cropped (i.e., external cues
were removed) and for all objects any “external” cue was also
removed (e.g., license plates of cars). Twenty-four grayscale
pictures of each category were used in the two conditions (inter-
and intra-category). The experiment was divided into four blocks
of sixty randomized trials. The stimuli subtended approximately
the following sizes, respectively in height and width: birds (6.41$
9.91), boats (8.51$9.91), cars (51$9.91), chairs (9.91$5.71)
and faces (9.21$7.11). The pictures were displayed on a white
background.
3.1.1.2. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 57; SD: 7.12).
3.1.1.3. Results and discussion. For the between-category discrimi-
nation (distractor from another category), performance was at ceiling
for all participants and categories (global performance of LR: 100%;
average global performance of controls: 99.6%, SD: 0.29; t9¼1.315,
p¼0.11). In the within-category discrimination (distractor from the
same category), LR performed in the normal range for the ﬁve
categories, including faces (all p-values above 0.18) (Fig. 2B).
Regarding RTs, LR performed in the normal range for the four non-
face categories (all p-values above 0.12). However, he was signiﬁcantly
slowed down for faces (LR: 1533ms; controls' mean: 991 ms, SD: 158;
t9¼3.271, po0.01), even though faces were not the most difﬁcult
items to discriminate for normal controls (Fig. 2C). These results show
that the patient probably uses an abnormal strategy to process faces.
His impairment does not seem to extend to other visual categories.
3.1.2. Experiment 2. discrimination of similar items: cars and faces
3.1.2.1. Material and procedure. This task was aimed at assessing
LR's ability to discriminate pictures of cars and faces presented at
different levels of physical similarity (a task described in Busigny,
Joubert et al., 2010; Busigny, Graf et al., 2010). Twenty photographs
of cars were selected and were morphed two-by-two with
Morph™. We extracted 5 distractors in increasing order of
dissimilarity from each original car photograph (20, 40, 60, 80
and 100%). For faces, 32 color laser scanned pictures of faces (from
the Max-Planck Institute, Germany) were used (half female) and
were morphed two-by-two (Morphable Model For The Synthesis
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Face and object discrimination at the individual level. (A) Examples of targets, probes and distractors in the intra-category discrimination. (B) Accuracy
rates for LR and controls in intra-category discrimination. (C) Response times on correct trials for LR and controls in intra-category discrimination. Error bars for controls
indicate standard errors. Asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-value provided by the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998), performed between LR and controls.
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Of 3D Faces; Blanz & Vetter, 1999). As for pictures of cars, we used
5 levels of (dis)similarity for the distractors (20, 40, 60, 80 and
100%). Overall, we used 32 trials for each level. The car stimuli
subtended approximately 5.71$12.71 and the face stimuli 7.81$
6.41, at 40 cm from the monitor. They were displayed on a white
background. The participants had to perform a 2-alternative
forced-choice (2AFC) matching task. The target was presented
ﬁrst during 2000 ms, followed by an ISI (1000 ms) and then a
screen appeared showing the target together with a distractor.
This distractor consisted in one of ﬁve levels of morphing of
the target item. The patient had to decide which of the two
probe pictures was the same as the previous one by pressing a
corresponding key. The experiment was divided into four blocks of
80 trials (blocks 1 & 3 displayed faces and blocks 2 & 4 displayed
cars, and the order was kept identical for every control and the
patient).
Typical participants are expected to perform better and faster
with the most dissimilar distractor, with a progressive increase of
error rates and RTs as the visual similarity between the target and
distractor increases. If LR's face processing impairment is due to an
increased difﬁculty with visually similar items, then the slope of
increase of error rates and correct RTs should be steeper for LR
than for normal controls.
3.1.2.2. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 59.9; SD: 6.96).
3.1.2.3. Results and discussion
3.1.2.3.1. Car pictures. Overall, LR performed in the normal
range in accuracy and correct RTs (see Table 2). In accuracy, LR
was in the normal range for the 5 levels (all p-values above 0.21;
see Table 2 and Fig. 3B). For the most difﬁcult level, in which the
dissimilarity between the target and the distractor is only of 20%,
LR scored at chance level, as did four of the controls. We also
compared the regression slopes of LR and controls (see Armitage,
1980): LR's slope did not differ signiﬁcantly from controls
(t6¼0.284, p¼0.79).
For correct RTs, LR was also in the normal range for the 5 levels
(all p-values above 0.08; see Table 2 and Fig. 3B) and his slope did
not differ from that of the controls (t6¼0.724, p¼0.49).
As expected, control participants showed decreased of accuracy
and increased response time with the degree of dissimilarity: the
more similar the distractor was to the target (from 100% difference
to 20% difference), the less efﬁcient were the controls. The
decrease in performance with decreasing levels of dissimilarity
was also noticeable for accuracy and RTs for LR. He obtained
exactly the same results as controls: at each level, his accuracy and
correct response times were in the normal range, his pattern of
performance following exactly the same slope as the controls.
3.1.2.3.2. Face pictures. Control participants' performance
decreased progressively as similarity between the target face and
its distractor increased, just like their pattern of performance with
pictures of cars. However, LR's pattern of results with faces was
strikingly different from his performance with pictures of cars.
First, although LR's overall performance did not differ signiﬁcantly
from normal controls (p¼0.08), he was signiﬁcantly impaired in
accuracy for the three ﬁrst levels of dissimilarity, the three easiest
ones, that is 100% (po0.001), 80% (po0.05), and 60% (po0.05)
(Table 3). His accuracy rates were in the range of normal controls
for the last two levels (see Table 3 and Fig. 4B). He was slowed
down overall (po0.01), and signiﬁcantly slowed down relative to
controls for the ﬁrst four levels of dissimilarity, at 100% (po0.001),
80% (po0.001), 60% (po0.01) and 40% (po0.01). He performed
in the normal range at the ﬁfth level of dissimilarity – the most
difﬁcult one (see Table 3 and Fig. 4B). LR's regression slopes did not
differ from controls, neither for accuracy rates (t6¼0.116, p¼0.91),
nor correct response times (t6¼0.994, p¼0.36).
Altogether, these observations yet again contradict the account
of prosopagnosia in terms of impairment in processing visually
similar items (Faust, 1955; Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982;
Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999) and replicate the recent ﬁndings
obtained with two other cases of acquired prosopagnosia (Busigny,
Joubert et al., 2010; Busigny, Graf et al., 2010). Like these two cases,
LR's slope of accuracy and RTs at discriminating visually similar
pictures of cars was entirely normal. With faces, LR's decreased
performance relative to controls was the largest when the faces to
discriminate were clearly dissimilar, showing a very similar
pattern of performance as the previous cases (albeit with a less
severe impairment). This ﬁnding directly contradicts the view that
prosopagnosia is due to a difﬁculty in processing items that are
visually similar because under this hypothesis one would have
expected LR's difﬁculties to rather increase more than controls as
similarity increases. Admittedly, we cannot exclude that the
absence of a difference for the most difﬁcult visual discrimination
level reﬂects a ﬂoor effect (the control participants performing
relatively poorly with highly similar faces), even though there was
still room for a decrease of performance even with highly similar
faces (40% of dissimilarity: 79% of correct responses; 20% of
dissimilarity: 66% of correct responses for normal participants)
and increase of RTs.
If LR's prosopagnosia is not a problem at disambiguating items
that are visually similar, alternative explanations need to be
considered. In the next section, we directly test LR's holistic
perception of individual faces.
3.2. Holistic perception of the individual face
3.2.1. Face inversion effect
Inversion is perhaps the most widely used transformation applied
to face stimuli in the scientiﬁc literature, following the work of Yin
(1969), in which it was found that this manipulation affected the
recognition of faces much more than other mono-oriented object
categories. While the reason(s) underlying the detrimental effect
of face inversion continues to be a matter a debate in the literature
Table 2
LR' accuracy rates and response times for the experiment 2: Discrimination of visually similar pictures of cars. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. T-values
correspond to the modiﬁed single case t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998).
Accuracy(%) RTs (ms)
Controls LR t p (one-tailed) Controls LR t p (one-tailed)
100% diff. 97.8 (3.24) 96.9 0.265 0.40 1271 (155) 1403 0.812 0.22
80% 95.8 (4.66) 100 0.859 0.21 1413 (232) 1366 0.193 0.43
60% 90.1 (6.42) 93.8 0.550 0.30 1527 (306) 1620 0.290 0.39
40% 83.1 (9.09) 84.4 0.136 0.45 1910 (426) 2612 1.571 0.08
20% 61.3 (14.43) 56.3 0.330 0.37 2807 (1273) 3067 0.195 0.43
Overall 85.6 (5.74) 86.3 0.116 0.46 1853 (529) 2014 0.290 0.39
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Fig. 3. Experiment 2: discrimination of visually similar items: Cars. (A) Examples of car stimuli. (B) Accuracy and response times of LR and controls for the car category. Error
bars for controls indicate standard errors.
Table 3
LR' accuracy rates and response times for the experiment 2: Discrimination of gradually similar faces (npo0.05; nnpo0.01; nnnpo0.001). Standard deviations are provided in
parentheses. T-values correspond to the modiﬁed single case t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998).
Accuracy(%) RTs (ms)
Controls LR t p (one-tailed) Controls LR t p (one-tailed)
100% diff. 99.5 (0.75) 90.6 11.314 0.000nnn 999 (93) 1533 5.475 0.000nnn
80% 98.1 (1.44) 93.8 2.847 0.010n 1094 (122) 1715 4.853 0.000nnn
60% 94.1 (3.19) 87.5 1.973 0.040n 1174 (133) 1704 3.800 0.002nn
40% 79.1 (6.76) 78.1 0.141 0.45 1404 (187) 2252 4.324 0.001nn
20% 66.6 (11.30) 57.8 0.743 0.24 1921 (718) 2760 1.114 0.15
Overall 87.5 (3.64) 81.6 1.548 0.08 1278 (191) 1993 3.569 0.003nn
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(for recent reviews, see Rossion, 2008, 2009), most authors agree that
inversion affects our ability to perceive a face holistically/conﬁgurally
(Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch,
2002; Rossion, 2008, 2009). Several cases of prosopagnosia have been
tested with upright and inverted faces (e.g., McNeil & Warrington,
1991; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; Marotta, McKeeff, &
Behrmann, 2002; Riddoch et al., 2008). According to a recent review,
the face inversion effect is present abnormally in cases of acquired
prosopagnosia, being generally reduced or even abolished (Busigny &
Rossion, 2010a).
Bukach et al. (2006) already tested LR with upright vs. inverted
faces in a sequential-matching paradigm. However, the stimuli
were also modiﬁed in terms of spatial relations between parts
(position of the eyes and the mouth) and the parts themselves
(identity of the eyes and the mouth). The authors reported a
decrease of sensitivity to the eye region, as already mentioned, but
there was no direct comparison of LR's performance for inverted
faces vs. upright faces relative to controls, so that the presence and
magnitude of LR's inversion effect for faces remain unclear. More-
over, there were no other visual stimuli included in the paradigm
Fig. 4. Experiment 2: discrimination of visually similar items: Faces. (A) Examples of face stimuli. (B) Accuracy and response times of LR and controls for the face category.
Error bars for controls indicate standard errors. Asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-values provided by the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998), performed
between LR and controls.
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to test whether a potential disruption of performance by inversion
would be speciﬁc to faces. Here, we conducted two new experi-
ments dedicated to assess face inversion effect in LR, the ﬁrst
experiment (Experiment 3) simply comparing results in the
Benton Face Recognition Test (BFRT) in the upright and the
inverted orientations, the second experiment (Experiment 4)
comparing inversion effect for faces to inversion effect for another
class of mono-oriented stimuli (cars).
3.2.2. Experiment 3. BFRT upright and inverted
3.2.2.1. Material and procedure. LR was administered an electronic
version of the BFRT, with faces in upright (day 1) and inverted (day
2) orientations. Control participants also performed the upright
orientation ﬁrst and the inverted orientation one day later.
3.2.2.2. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 56.4; SD: 7.06).
3.2.2.3. Results. There was a large inversion effect for control
participants (17% on average, t9¼10.468, po0.001) (Fig. 5). In
contrast, there was no signiﬁcant difference between upright and
inverted faces for LR (Chi21¼0.831, p¼0.18) (Fig. 5). LR performed
lower than control participants for upright faces (t9¼2.456,
po0.05), while he performed in the normal range for inverted
faces (t9¼#1.546, p¼0.08). Note that LR's performance was
clearly above chance level (18/54¼33%) in the test, so that this
absence of inversion effect cannot be attributed to a ﬂoor effect.
Importantly, these results also show that LR is not only
impaired at processing faces when there is a temporal delay
between the items to match/discriminate (as suggested in
Bukach et al., 2006), but that he may also have difﬁculties at
matching/discriminating faces presented simultaneously.
Regarding RTs, controls performed the test signiﬁcantly faster
for upright (mean: 5min47″; SD: 80″) than inverted faces (mean:
7min41″, SD: 148″, t9¼3.284, po0.01). Compared to controls, LR
was slowed down at both orientations (upright: 10min44″,
t9¼3.540, po0.01; inverted: 13min28″, t9¼2.235, po0.05). He
was also slightly faster in the upright condition. However only the
total time to perform the test was calculated for both orientations.
In consequence, we were not able to calculate and compare
response times on correct trials as we did in the other experi-
ments, and as will be done in the following experiment.
3.2.3. Experiment 4. Delayed matching of faces and cars upright and
upside-down
3.2.3.1. Material and procedure. This second experiment aimed at
comparing the inversion effect for faces to the effect for a highly
familiar non-face category, namely pictures of cars. It is known
that non-face categories, in particular car pictures, also elicit
inversion costs in matching or recognition tasks, but of much
smaller magnitude than for faces (e.g. Yin, 1969; Scapinello &
Yarmey, 1970; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Leder & Carbon, 2006;
Robbins & McKone, 2007; Rossion & Curran, 2010). In this second
experiment, we used a delayed two-alternative forced choice
matching task (Experiment 4 in Busigny & Rossion, 2010a). One
full front and one 3/4 proﬁle grayscale photographs of 36 faces
(eighteen females) and 36 cars were used. The target picture was
always a full-front picture, and the probe a 3/4 proﬁle picture.
Each photograph was presented in upright and inverted
orientations. Participants had to choose which of two 3/4 proﬁle
probes was the same identity as the full-front target presented
earlier by pressing a keyboard key (left or right) corresponding to
the location of the target face (or car). Each trial began with a
white screen (1000 ms), followed by the target (2000 ms), an ISI
(1000 ms), and the probe screen (until response). Each new trial
was initiated after the response of the participants. The
experiment was divided into two blocks of 72 randomized trials
preceded by seven practice trials. In total, 72 trials were used for
both orientations (36 per condition). The size of the stimuli
subtended approximately 7.11$5.71 for faces and 51$7.81 for
cars, presented on a white background.
3.2.3.2. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 57.9; SD: 8.02).
3.2.3.3. Results and discussion. Control participants had a large face
inversion effect on accuracy (t9¼11.558, po0.001) and on correct
RTs (t9¼6.553, po0.001). For upright faces, LR performed lower
than controls (t9¼1.902, po0.05) and he was signiﬁcantly slowed
down (t9¼4.466, po0.01). With inverted faces, his performance
was within the normal range for accuracy (t9¼0.291, p¼0.39), but
he was also slowed down relative to controls (t9¼2.985, po0.01)
(Fig. 6A and B). Importantly, there was no face inversion effect for
LR, neither in accuracy (Chi21¼0.799, p¼0.19), nor in correct RTs
(t50¼0.327, p¼0.37; mean7SD RT computed across trials:
upright: 336872326 ms; inverted: 356471884 ms).
For pictures of cars, control participants did not show a
signiﬁcant inversion effect in accuracy (t9¼1.525, p¼0.08) but
they did so in correct RTs (t9¼3.04, po0.01). LR's performance did
not differ from controls for upright (t9¼0.494, p¼0.32) and
inverted cars (t9¼0.289, p¼0.39). Just like the control participants,
he did not show a signiﬁcant car inversion effect in accuracy
(Chi21¼1.530, p¼0.11) (Fig. 6A). Regarding RTs, LR did not differ
from controls at any orientation (upright cars: t9¼0.214, p¼0.42;
inverted cars: t¼0.057, p¼0.48). Hence, like normal controls, LR
had a signiﬁcant inversion effect in correct RTs for cars
(t67¼10.436, po0.01; mean7SD RT computed across trials:
upright: 14447744 ms; inverted: 17597927 ms) (Fig. 6B).
We also computed an index of the inversion effect that
combines the accuracy rates and correct RTs, in order to take into
account possible speed-accuracy trade-offs and to assess the
magnitude of the face inversion effect for LR and each control
participant. First, we computed the inverse efﬁciency (average
response times of the correct trials divided by accuracy; Townsend
& Ashby, 1983). Next, we calculated the percentage of the face
inversion effect for each participant using the following formula:
(Inverse efﬁciency upright# Inverse efﬁciency inverted)/(Inverse
efﬁciency uprightþ Inverse efﬁciency inverted). We calculated
these indexes of inversion effects for both cars and faces. The
indexes indicate that LR was the only participant who showed a
tendency for a larger inversion index for cars than faces (Fig. 6C).
In contrast, all normal participants had a larger inversion effect for
faces than for cars. Notably, LR's car inversion index (12.7%) was in
the normal (upper) range (mean: 5.9%, SD: 4.87; t9¼1.331,
p¼0.11), while his face inversion index (7.1%) was signiﬁcantly
Fig. 5. Experiment 3: Benton Face Recognition Test in upright and the inverted
orientations. Accuracy rates of LR and controls. Error bars for controls indicate
standard errors. Asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-value provided by the
paired sample t-test performed between upright and inverted orientations in
controls.
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below normal controls (mean: 22.5%, SD: 6.23; t¼2.357, po0.05).
Moreover, results from applying the Revised Standardized Differ-
ence Test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005), to compare a single
patient's discrepancy with the control sample, showed that LR had
a proﬁle signiﬁcantly different from controls (t9¼2.802, po0.05).
While the controls presented with a stronger inversion effect for
faces than for cars, LR did not show this dissociation.
In conclusion, LR's proﬁle of performance was comparable to
normal observers when matching pictures of upright cars across
viewpoint changes. In contrast, LR performed lower than controls
when matching faces. This observation reinforces the selectivity of
his impairment for faces. In addition, LR did not present with a
normal effect of inversion for faces. Since his inversion effect for
photographs of cars was in the normal range, this absence of an
inversion effect cannot be explained by a general factor. Hence,
LR's acquired prosopagnosia seems to affect primarily a process
that is speciﬁc to upright faces. These observations are in line with
the absence of inversion effect for the prosopagnosic patient PS
tested extensively with upright and inverted faces (Busigny &
Rossion, 2010a), as well as for other such patients (e.g., McNeil &
Warrington, 1991; Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Delvenne et al.,
2004; Busigny et al., 2010b).
3.2.4. Experiment 5. whole-to-part effect
3.2.4.1. Rationale. We aimed to provide more direct evidence for
the patient LR's deﬁcient holistic processing of individual faces.
A paradigm that is classically used is the face superiority effect
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993), also called the whole-part advantage (e.g.,
Delvenne et al, 2004). It refers to the superior discrimination of
two whole faces differing by one part (e.g., the eyes) in comparison
to the discrimination of these parts when they are shown in
isolation. In other words, the discrimination of the diagnostic part
is facilitated by the presence (and correct organization) of the
remaining facial parts. This effect is thought to reﬂect the fact that
a change of one diagnostic part affects the whole face, thus making
the discrimination easier (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Different kinds of
whole-part advantage paradigms have been used with
prosopagnosic patients: two-alternative forced choice matching
tasks (Davidoff & Landis, 1990; Delvenne et al., 2004; Wilkinson
et al., 2009) or variants with “Thatcherized” faces (Boutsen &
Humphreys, 2002; Riddoch et al., 2008). All these studies showed
that patients with acquired prosopagnosia were relatively
impaired at showing an advantage for processing whole faces vs.
isolated parts.
Here we assessed this effect in a delayed face matching task, as
in most studies with normal observers (e.g., Michel, Caldara, &
Rossion, 2006a; Goffaux & Rossion, 2006). We presented wholes
and parts of faces preceded by whole faces, and we completed the
paradigm by also including trials in which the ﬁrst stimulus could
be part of a face followed by wholes or parts of faces (see Ramon
et al., 2010). The diagnostic cue for analysis was the eyes, but there
were foil trials for mouth and nose. The prediction was that,
for normal observers, the performance would be better (higher
Fig. 6. Experiment 4: Delayed matching of faces and cars upright and upside-down. (A) Accuracy rates for LR and controls. (B) Response times on correct trials for LR and
controls. (C) Individual indexes of inversion calculated with the following formula: (Upright# Inverted)/(Uprightþ Inverted). Error bars for controls indicate standard errors
computed across subjects. In (A and B), asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-values provided by the paired sample t-tests for controls and the independent sample t-test
for LR. In (C), the asterisk refers to the signiﬁcance of the t-value provided by the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998) performed between LR and controls.
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accuracy, slower RTs) when the format of the encoding (target)
stimuli and format of the subsequently presented test (probe)
stimuli were identical. That is, the conditions “part-part” and
“whole-whole” should be associated with superior performance
as compared to “part-whole” and “whole-part”, respectively. Thus,
the effect would not necessarily be a whole/part advantage, but a
demonstration that the processing of facial parts, at least in
normal participants, is inﬂuenced by the presence of the other
features (see Leder & Carbon, 2005).
3.2.4.2. Material and procedure. Thirty grayscale full-front pictures
of unfamiliar faces (half female) posing with a neutral expression,
cropped without external features and free of facial hair or glasses
served as stimuli. Using Adobe Photoshop, we created 20 eye-foils
by swapping the eye region amongst 20 of the original faces. The
remaining ten original faces were used to generate ﬁve nose-foils
and ﬁve mouth-foils using the same feature swapping procedure.
Isolated features (eyes, nose or mouth) were generated by
isolating the relevant feature, resulting in a total of 30 feature
stimuli (20 isolated eyes, ﬁve noses, ﬁve mouths). Nose and mouth
foil face parts and whole faces were used as catch trials (one third
of the trials, 40/120) in the experiment to avoid participants
exclusively focusing on the eyes, and these trials were not
analyzed (as in our previous studies with this paradigm: e.g.,
Michel et al., 2006a; Ramon et al., 2010).
The task was delayed two-alternative forced choice identity
matching, as described previously in Ramon et al. (2010) and
Busigny et al. (2010a). Trials began with a target face stimuli
presented centrally for 2000 ms. Following a blank screen of
500 ms, two juxtaposed probe stimuli remained on the screen
until a response was made. Participants were instructed to select
the probe that matched the target stimulus by pressing the key
corresponding with probe location (right versus left) on the
screen. The next trial started 1000 ms after each response. The
target stimulus was either an original face (whole-whole and
whole-part conditions) or a single part (part-part and part-whole
conditions). Each target item was slightly larger in size than the
probe stimuli.
In the whole display condition, the probes were whole faces,
one identical to the target, the other one (i.e., the foil) differing
from the target by a single part (eyes in experimental trials, nose
or mouth in catch trials). In the part display condition, the probes
depicted isolated face parts (eyes in experimental trials, nose or
mouth in catch trials) (see Fig. 7A). There were 40 trials per
experimental condition, and 160 trials in total. Each target and
probe stimulus appeared four times. The location of foil stimuli
(right versus left) was counterbalanced. Eighty catch trials (mouth
and nose whole and part foils) were added, giving a total of 240
(four blocks of 60 trials). Trial order was at random and varied for
each participant. Six practice trials were completed before the
experiment commenced. The target stimulus subtended 5$61 of
visual angle, while size of the subsequently presented probes
differed depending on probe type (whole faces: 4.1$4.11; eye
feature stimuli: 0.7$41; nose features: 1.4$1.41; mouth features:
1$21). All stimuli were presented on a gray background.
3.2.4.3. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 59.4; SD: 6.8).
3.2.4.4. Results and discussion. Normal controls showed a signi-
ﬁcant advantage in the whole-whole as compared to the whole-part
condition (“Whole-part advantage”) with respect to accuracy
(t9¼2.587, po0.05) and correct RTs (t9¼12.852, po0.001)
(Fig. 7B & C). They also showed a signiﬁcant “Part-whole
disadvantage” when comparing the part-part and the part-whole
conditions, both in terms of accuracy (t9¼3.399, po0.01), and
correct RTs (t9¼5.387, po0.001). These results show that the
control participants are better and faster when the encoding and
retrieval face context is the same.
In contrast, LR showed no difference between the whole-part
and the whole-whole conditions, neither in accuracy nor in
correct RTs (t60¼0.684, p¼0.25; mean7SD RT computed across
trials: whole-whole: 21037684 ms; whole-part: 22187639 ms)
(Fig. 7B & C).
Considering the part-part and the part-whole conditions, LR
showed no signiﬁcant effect in accuracy (Chi21¼2.057, p¼0.08),
but there was a signiﬁcant difference in the expected direction
in RTs (t64¼2.749, po0.01; mean7SD RT computed across trials:
part-part: 15677361 ms; part-whole: 19707771 ms) (Fig. 7C).
Indexes were computed using the same formula that was used
for the inversion effect (see above). Thus we calculated an index
for the condition in which the whole face is presented ﬁrst
(Inverse efﬁciency whole-part# Inverse efﬁciency whole-whole)/
(Inverse efﬁciency whole-partþ Inverse efﬁciency whole-whole)
and for the condition in which the part is presented ﬁrst (Inverse
efﬁciency part-whole# Inverse efﬁciency part-part)/(Inverse efﬁ-
ciency part-wholeþ Inverse efﬁciency part-part). In the whole
display condition, each single control participant obtained a high
index of whole-part advantage (mean¼16.7%, SD: 6.86), but this
was not the case for LR, who obtained an index close to zero
(2.66%), signiﬁcantly lower than the controls (t9¼1.954, po0.05)
(Fig. 7D). In the part display condition, each participant showed a
high index of part-whole disadvantage (mean¼14.7%, SD: 4.91).
This time, LR did not show a signiﬁcantly reduced effect compared
to controls (LR: 15.4%, t9¼0.150, p¼0.44) (Fig. 7E).
In conclusion, normal controls show both a whole-part advan-
tage and a part-whole disadvantage, while LR shows only the
second effect. That is, he does not perform better at discriminating
a part embedded in a whole face than when presented in isolation.
However, when he is presented with a face part at encoding, he
recognizes the part better if it is isolated than when it is embedded
in a whole face. This effect could be the consequence of residual
face holistic processing. This residual face holistic processing could
be insufﬁcient to produce a positive effect (an advantage of the
face conﬁguration), but could be sufﬁcient to produce a negative
effect (the disadvantage of supplementary facial information). We
will come back to this issue in the discussion section.
3.2.5. Experiment 6. Composite face effect: top composite
(alignment$ identity)
3.2.5.1. Rationale. The composite face effect was originally described
by Young, Hellawell, and Hay (1987) as the difﬁculty to identify
the top half (or bottom half) of a famous face when it is aligned
with the bottom half (or top half) of another person. It is thought to
reﬂect the fact that one half of a face cannot be perceived in isolation,
but is integrated into a whole face representation. This paradigmwas
later applied to the matching of individual unfamiliar faces, in which
two identical top halves of faces are perceived as being slightly
different if they are aligned with distinct bottom halves (e.g., Hole,
1994; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004; Michel, Rossion,
Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006b; Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Rossion,
2013 for a review). As mentioned in the introduction, LR has already
been tested with composite faces by Bukach et al. (2006), who
concluded that he did not differ from normal controls at this task.
However, critically, these authors did not include misaligned face
halves in their paradigm, and thus merely tested a Stroop-like
congruency/interference effect (whether an irrelevant face half inter-
feres with a matching/discrimination decision on target face half),
not a composite face effect (see Rossion, 2013).
T. Busigny et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 312–333322
Fig. 7. Experiment 5: Whole-to-Part effect. (A) Examples of stimuli in each condition. (B) Accuracy rates for LR and controls. (C) Response times on correct trials for LR and
controls. (D) Individual indexes of the whole-part advantage calculated with the following formula: (whole-part#whole-whole)/(whole-partþwhole-whole). (E) Individual
indexes of part-whole disadvantage calculated with the following formula: (part-whole#part-part)/(part-wholeþpart-part). Error bars for controls indicate standard errors.
In Figs. 7B and C, asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-values provided by the paired sample t-tests for controls and the independent sample t-test for LR. In (D), the
asterisk refers to the signiﬁcance of the t-value provided by the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998), performed between LR and controls.
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Given these observations, we used the last experiment
described in Ramon et al. (2010), experiment 5; see also Busigny
et al., 2010a, experiment 24), in which there were four critical
conditions for which the top half of the faces was the same
(Aligned/Same Bottom; Aligned/Different Bottom; Misaligned/
Same Bottom; Misaligned/Different Bottom). For normal controls,
we expected a composite effect, that is an effect of alignment
(misaligned trials performed better than aligned trials), which
should be observed only when the bottom halves differ between
the faces to match. In contrast, this effect was not expected for LR.
3.2.5.2. Material and procedure. The stimuli used in this
experiment were full-front color pictures of 23 unfamiliar faces
(neutral expression, 16 female, no glasses or facial hair) that were
cropped so that neither hair nor external features were depicted.
The resulting faces, subtending approximately 160 pixels in width
and 230 pixels in height, were ﬁtted onto a white background.
Using Adobe Photoshop, the original faces were separated by
inserting a 1.76 mm gap located above the nostril upper limit.
The gap was used so that the border separating the top and
bottom halves could be well identiﬁed, even in the aligned
condition (see Rossion, 2013 for the rationale for using such a
gap). Each original face was transformed into two stimuli: the ﬁrst
one (“original”) differed from the original merely by the inserted
gap (Same Top/Same Bottom), the second one (“composite”) had a
given top part combined with a different bottom part from a
randomly selected other face (i.e., a composite face). Misaligned
versions were created by laterally offsetting the lower parts so that
the top part's right edge of the nose was aligned with the bottom
part's left side of the nose.
Participants performed a two-alternative forced choice decision
task (see Ramon et al., 2010; Busigny et al., 2010a). Each trial
involved the consecutive presentation of two stimuli (both either
aligned or misaligned), which had to be judged with regard to the
identity of the top part (i.e., same or different) (see Fig. 8A). There
were four possible trials requiring a “same” response: the original
face paired with itself (‘Aligned/Same Bottom’; ‘Misaligned/Same
Bottom’) and different composite faces that had the same top half
but a different bottom half (‘Aligned/Different Bottom’; ‘Misa-
ligned/Different Bottom’). There were also real “different” trials,
in which a face was paired with another randomly selected face so
that both face halves were different (see Rossion, 2013; Figure 26
for a display of this paradigm). This paradigm was used in several
previous studies and is highly sensitive to disclose a composite
face effect in normal participants (e.g., Ramon et al., 2010; Busigny
et al., 2010b).
Trials started with a ﬁxation cross presented centrally for
300 ms. Following a 200 ms blank, a target face was presented
for 600 ms. After a 300 ms ISI, the probe face appeared until a
response was provided. The next trial was initiated 1000 ms after a
given response. In order to restrict the possibility of participants
engaging in comparing merely a speciﬁc location of the display
while performing the matching task, the target and sample faces
appeared at slightly different screen locations. Participants were
asked to attend only to the top parts and to respond whether these
were the same or different (by pressing a right or left key,
respectively). In line with previous studies (e.g., Goffaux &
Rossion, 2006; Michel et al., 2006b), trials in which both halves
were different were used only as catch trials, and not considered in
the analysis (Rossion, 2013). The experiment consisted of a total of
138 trials, which were divided into two blocks of equal length.
There were 92 “same” trials (23 per condition) and 46 “different”
trials (23 per condition). Prior to the beginning of the experiment,
participants completed four practice trials. Aligned stimuli sub-
tended approximately 5.7$3.81 of visual angle and misaligned
stimuli 5.7$5.21.
3.2.5.3. Control participants. Ten healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 62; SD: 6.68).
3.2.5.4. Results. The data of age-matched normal controls are
illustrated in Fig. 8(B & C). The ANOVA for accuracy rates showed
a signiﬁcant main effect of alignment (F(1,9)¼5.000, po0.05), and a
signiﬁcant main effect of identity of the bottom half (F(1,9)¼7.653,
po0.05). Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between
the two factors (F(1,9)¼4.048, po0.05): performance decreased
only when the two parts were aligned and when the bottom face
half was different. The ANOVA for RTs showed a main effect of
alignment (F(1,9)¼3.844, po0.05), and a main effect of identity of
the bottom half (F(1,9)¼9.985, po0.01). Most importantly, in line
with the results for accuracy, there was a highly signiﬁcant
interaction between the two factors (F(1,9)¼26.963, po0.001).
These ﬁndings are a hallmark of holistic face perception for
control participants.
A bootstrap procedure with 10,000 iterations for each condition on
the accuracy rates of LR indicated the same proﬁle as the normal
controls: lower performance for the aligned stimuli with different
bottom halves (‘Aligned/Different Bottom’ trials,M¼0.78; CI¼[0.6087,
0.95652]) than for all other conditions (po0.01). Performance in both
misaligned conditions was at ceiling (M¼1; CI¼[1, 1]) and did not
differ signiﬁcantly from the aligned condition with same bottom
halves (‘Aligned/Same Bottom’ trials, M¼0.96; CI¼[0.86957, 1];
p¼0.40) (Fig. 8B). However, in correct RTs, LR's proﬁle was different.
He showed no signiﬁcant main effect of alignment (F(1,85)¼2.115,
p¼0.08), and only a main effect of identity (F(1,85)¼6.905, po0.01).
There was no interaction between the two factors (F(1,85)¼0.272,
p¼0.30) because LR showed an unexpected increase of RTs in the
‘Misaligned/Different Bottom’ condition (Fig. 8B & C).
To compare LR's magnitude of composite effect with the controls,
indexes were computed individually by using the formula: (‘Aligned/
Same Bottom’# ‘Aligned/Different Bottom’)#(‘Misaligned/Same Bot-
tom’# ‘Misaligned/Different Bottom’). As in our previous study
(Busigny et al., 2010b), given the inter-subject variance in the
magnitude of the effect in accuracy rates, the indexes were calculated
on the normalized correct response times. There was a high index of
composite effect (mean¼18.39%, SD: 5.7) for every participant. LR's
composite face effect index was in the lower range but did not differ
from controls (LR: 11.08%; t¼1.223, p¼0.13) (Fig. 8D). However, a
careful look at the data suggests that LR has a different proﬁle of
response in this task than normal controls. Indeed, while LR's
performance was inﬂuenced by the identity of the bottom half
similarly to the normal controls in the aligned condition (LR: 33.5%,
controls mean: 19.08%, SD: 9.45, t9¼1.455, p¼0.09) (Fig. 8E), he also
showed an inﬂuence of the bottom half in the misaligned condition
(LR: 22.4%), contrary to normal controls (mean: 0.68%, SD: 6.44;
t9¼3.216, po0.01) (Fig. 8F).
Interestingly, these results do not contradict the results
obtained by Bukach et al. (2006; Experiment 2), who reported
that the identity of the bottom half of the face inﬂuenced LR's
judgment on the top half. However, thanks to the inclusion of
misaligned trials in the present study, a necessary baseline to
measure the composite face effect (Rossion, 2013), we found that
this inﬂuence generalizes to misaligned trials to some extent only
for LR, leading to an uncharacteristic proﬁle of response. This
inﬂuence may be due to LR's well-documented tendency to use
the lower part of the face, the mouth in particular, to match faces
(Bukach et al., 2006, 2008). Importantly, such a strategy cannot be
associated with preserved holistic processing.
3.2.6. Experiment 7. Gaze contingent individual face discrimination
3.2.6.1. Rationale. Gaze-contingently revealing/masking a portion
of the visual ﬁeld in a face matching task provides a way to
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Fig. 8. Experiment 6: Composite face effect. (A) Examples of stimuli in each condition. (B) Accuracy rates for LR and controls in the four conditions for which the top half is
the same. (C) Response times on correct trials for LR and controls (LR0 variance computed on trials is: ‘aligned/same bottom’: 10967543; ‘aligned/different bottom’:
14997589; ‘misaligned/same bottom’: 9767246; ‘misaligned/different bottom’: 12467689). (D) Indexes of composite effect calculated with the following formula:
(‘aligned/same bottom’# ‘aligned/different bottom’)#(‘misaligned/same bottom’# ‘misaligned/different bottom’). (E) Indexes of the composite effect for the aligned trials
calculated with the following formula: ‘aligned/same bottom’# ‘aligned/different bottom’. (F) Indexes of the composite effect for the misaligned trials calculated with the
following formula: ‘misaligned/same bottom’# ‘misaligned/different bottom’. Error bars for controls indicate standard errors. In (F), asterisks refer to the signiﬁcance of the t-
value provided by the modiﬁed t-test of Crawford and Howell (1998), performed between LR and controls.
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selectively impair holistic or analytical processing. In a ‘window’
condition, only the ﬁxated part is visible in a gaze-contingent
window, preventing perception of multiple parts in the face at
once, and impairing holistic perception. On the contrary, a mask
condition, in which a mask covers the ﬁxated part only, impairs
analytical perception by preventing the use of highly detailed
foveal information necessary for analytical processing (Fig. 9). This
method demonstrated impairment in holistic face perception in
two cases of acquired prosopagnosia: PS (Van Belle et al., 2010a)
and GG (Van Belle et al., 2011). Compared to full view, PS' and GG's
performance was almost unaffected when they could see only one
part of the faces at a time (window condition), while they were
largely impaired when the whole face but the ﬁxated part was
visible (mask condition). These ﬁndings were opposite to the
observations made on normal controls. Gaze-contingency was
also used to show that the face inversion effect increases in
the mask condition and decreases in the window condition,
reinforcing the link between these manipulations and the
selective disruption of holistic vs. analytical processing (Van
Belle, de Graef, Verfaillie, Rossion, & Lefèvre, 2010b).
Here, if LR has difﬁculties with holistic perception of individual
faces, we expect his performance to differ from that of the control
participants, especially in the mask condition.
3.2.6.2. Material and procedure. The methods are similar to the
recent study of Van Belle et al. (2011) and will be brieﬂy described
here. For this experiment we used a stimulus set of 10 male and 10
female faces (KDEF database, Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998) with a
height of 151, fromwhich the external features were cropped but head
shape was largely preserved. A drift correction with a central ﬁxation
cross was followed by a centrally presented face. After 1 s, this
reference face was replaced by two faces presented side-by-side,
with a distance between the faces' inner borders of approximately
101. The participant's task was to indicate which of the two faces
corresponded to the reference face by pressing the assigned left or
right key on the keyboard. The faces were randomly combined in pairs
of two males or two females.
Participants could freely explore the side-by-side presented
faces. In one third of the trials the faces were completely visible
(full view). In another third of the trials, however, a gaze
contingent mask covered the ﬁxated feature in the central part
of the visual ﬁeld (mask condition). In the remaining third of the
trials only the ﬁxated feature in the central part of the visual ﬁeld
was visible through a limited spatial window (window condition)
(Fig. 9).1 The elliptical window and mask were 6$51. During the
exploration of the pair of faces, the face that was not ﬁxated was
replaced by a grayscale average of all faces in order to provide an
equal reference frame for saccade planning, and an equal amount
of information from the non-ﬁxated face in all viewing conditions
(Fig. 9). There were 75 trials per viewing condition, resulting in a
total of 225 trials, presented in 5 blocks of 45 trials each. Viewing
condition order was randomized across trials.
3.2.6.3. Control participants. Seven healthy controls were tested
(mean age: 57; SD: 2.93).
Fig. 9. Experiment 7: Gaze-contingent individual face discrimination (from Van Belle et al., 2010a). (A) Full view: the whole face is visible, central mask: only the non-ﬁxated
part of the face is visible, central window: only the ﬁxated area of the face is visible. (B) experimental design: drift correction was followed by a ﬁxation outside of the face
area, a 1 s presentation of the reference face and two faces side by side until response.
1 Movies of the gaze-contingency experiment as performed by the patient PS
in a previous study are available at http://face-categorization-lab.webnode.com/
pictures/.
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3.2.6.4. Results. Control participants showed a main effect of
viewing condition on accuracy (F(2, 12)¼6.51, po0.05). Individual
contrasts were Tukey corrected for multiple comparisons (two-
tailed). Compared to full view (M¼0.97), accuracy signiﬁcantly
decreased with a window (M¼0.87, t(12)¼3.54, po0.05) but not
with a mask (M¼0.90, t(12)¼2.38, p¼0.08). Performance with a
mask did not differ signiﬁcantly from that with a window
(t(12)¼1.16, p¼0.50). The main effect in response times was also
signiﬁcant, (F(2, 12)¼4.30, po0.05). Again, participants were only
signiﬁcantly slower with a window (M¼2.34 s) than in full view
(M¼1.27 s, t(12)¼2.93, po0.05). The difference between response
times in full view and with a mask was not signiﬁcant (M¼1.56 s,
t(12)¼2.29, p¼0.29); additionally, response times with a mask did
not differ signiﬁcantly from those with a window (t(12)¼1.34,
p¼0.40).
A bootstrap procedure with 1000 repetitions showed that,
compared to full view (M¼0.96; 95% CI¼[0.91; 1.00]), the accu-
racy of LR was equally affected by the window (M¼0.87; 95% CI¼
[0.79; 0.93]) and the mask (M¼0.88; 95% CI¼[0.80; 0.95])
(Fig. 10A). For RTs, an ANOVA on the correct response trials
revealed a main effect of the viewing condition for LR (LR: F(2,
179)¼57.40, po0.0001). Contrary to the control participants, LR
was faster in full view than with a mask (LR: t(179)¼10.70,
po0.0001) or with a window (LR: t(179)¼5.44, po0.0001)
(Fig. 10B). Importantly, LR was also faster with a window than
with a mask (t(179)¼5.18, po0.0001), contrary to normal controls.
Crawford and Howell's (Crawford & Howell, 1998) method for
the analysis of single case neuropsychological data was used to
compare LR's performance directly to that of the control partici-
pants. LR's accuracy did not differ signiﬁcantly from that of the age
matched control participants in any of the conditions (full view:
t(6)¼0.47, p¼0.33 ; window: t(6)¼0.15, p¼0.44; mask: t(6)¼0.16,
p¼0.44). His response times, on the contrary, were slower than the
age matched control participants in full view (t(6)¼2.017, po0.05)
and with a mask (t(6)¼3.55, po0.01). However, with a window, LR
performed within the normal range (t(6)¼0.80, p¼0.23) (Fig. 10).
Finally, in order to assess the differential effect of the window and
mask on control participants vs. LR, we calculated the index of the RT
increase due to window and mask (Fig. 11) as the difference between
the performance in full view and each experimental condition, divided
by the sum of these performances. LR was signiﬁcantly more slowed
down by the mask than the control participants (t(6)¼3.867, po0.01),
while the effect of the window did not signiﬁcantly differ for LR and
for the control participants (t(6)¼0.090, p¼0.47).
In summary, LR is undoubtedly less severely impaired than the
two cases of acquired prosopagnosia previously tested in this
experiment (PS: Van Belle et al., 2010a; GG: Van Belle et al., 2011),
showing accuracy rates in the normal range. However, the difﬁculty
of the discrimination task was adjusted initially for the patient PS, in
order to obtain a reasonably high performance in the full view face
condition. Here, the most interesting pattern is observed in response
times only, for which LR's results are completely in line with the
observations made on these two cases, and opposite to normal
observers: for LR, the mask condition appears to be the most difﬁcult
viewing conditions. Hence, compared to normal observers, LR's
performance is affected the most when he is prevented from using
a part-based process; when forced to use a part-based process, on
the contrary, his performance does not differ from that of normal
observers. These results support the view that, like PS and GG, LR is
impaired at holistic perception of the individual face.
Fig. 10. Experiment 7: Gaze-contingent individual face discrimination. (A) Accuracy rates for LR and controls, including individual participants' performance. (B) Response
times on correct trials for LR and controls, including individual participants' performance. Error bars indicate standard errors.
Fig. 11. Experiment 7: Gaze-contingent individual face discrimination. Index of RT
increase due to window or mask compared to full view ((RTcond#RTfull)/
(RTcondþRTfull). Error bars indicate standard errors.
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4. General discussion
Several experiments performed on the patient LR show that
face perception can be speciﬁcally impaired in prosopagnosia
following brain damage to the right anterior temporal lobe,
sparing posterior regions. The nature of LR's impairment appears
to concern holistic perception of individual faces, as is observed in
cases of prosopagnosia with posterior brain damage. These results
extend previous observations obtained using the same tests with
two other cases of acquired prosopagnosia, PS and GG. Notably, in
these two patients, brain damage concerned posterior brain areas,
namely the right inferior occipital cortex and left middle fusiform
gyrus for PS and the right lingual, fusiform and parahippocampic
gyrus for GG, sparing the anterior temporal lobe region (see in
particular Rossion et al., 2003; Ramon et al., 2010; Sorger, Goebel,
Schiltz, & Rossion, 2007 for PS; Busigny et al., 2010a; Van Belle
et al., 2011 for GG). Compared to these patients, the patient LR is
less severely impaired in the same face discrimination tasks,
whose parameters were adjusted initially for studying the patient
PS. Moreover, contrary to these cases, LR's ability to process
individual faces holistically may not be completely abolished, as
indicated by a signiﬁcant part-whole advantage in one version of
the experiment 5 and a signiﬁcant – albeit weaker than in controls
– composite face effect in experiment 6. Nevertheless, considered
altogether, these observations support the view that the nature of
the critical functional impairment does not fundamentally differ
across patients with acquired prosopagnosia, regardless of the
localization of brain damage (Busigny et al., 2010a): all these
patients appear to be impaired at what constitutes the heart of our
visual expertise with faces, namely holistic perception at a
sufﬁciently ﬁne-grained level of resolution to discriminate exem-
plars of the face class efﬁciently (for a direct comparison of LR, PS
and GG, see Busigny & Rossion, 2010b, and Supplementary
material). Such a conclusion challenges the view that there are
several subtypes of prosopagnosia (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1990; Schweich & Bruyer, 1993) casting doubts in particular on the
dichotomy between apperceptive and associative forms of proso-
pagnosia (e.g., De Renzi, 1986; De Renzi et al., 1991; Barton, 2003).
4.1. Face-speciﬁcity
Experiments 1 and 2 show that LR, who never complained of
any object recognition problems in real life, is able to identify
objects rapidly when tested, and is not impaired at ﬁne-grained
discrimination of non-face exemplars. In a delayed matching task,
he was able to match individual exemplars of various nonface
categories (birds, cars, chairs, houses) as well as controls. Further-
more, his pattern of performance (i.e., slope) in a parametric
individual car discrimination task mimicked normal observers'
performance. However, LR was impaired at discriminating indivi-
dual exemplars of faces in the exact same paradigm, despite the
fact that, if anything, individual face discrimination was easier for
faces than nonface objects for normal observers.2 This pattern of
performance is very similar to what was found for the patients PS
(Busigny et al., 2010b) and GG (Busigny et al., 2010a), ruling out the
visual similarity account of prosopagnosia (Faust, 1955; Damasio
et al., 1982; Gauthier et al., 1999), and indicating that brain damage
to vastly different brain structures can lead to a pure form of
prosopagnosia (see also other cases, as listed in Table 1 in Busigny
et al., 2010b).
4.2. Impairment in holistic face perception
Although LR's impairment in holistic face perception is not as
clear-cut as the patients PS and GG, our experiments 3 to 7 show
that LR is impaired at holistic perception of individual faces.
Indeed, the patient does not discriminate upright faces better
than inverted faces, and he does not present with a typical whole-
part face advantage. Interestingly, we replicated the ﬁnding that
his processing of the top half of a face is inﬂuenced by the bottom
half, an observation which prompted Bukach et al. (2006) to claim
that LR processed faces holistically. However, this effect was
qualiﬁed here by a substantial inﬂuence observed also for mis-
aligned faces – which were not included in this previous study –
speciﬁcally for LR. Most importantly, LR's pattern of performance
in the gaze-contingency experiment with selective revealing/
masking of a portion of the face stimulus replicates previous
observations on PS and GG (Van Belle et al., 2010a; Van Belle
et al. 2011, respectively) and demonstrates LR's difﬁculties in
holistic perception of individual faces relative to normal observers.
Although Bukach et al. (2006) concluded that LR has preserved
holistic processing, a careful look at the patient's data in these
author's other experiments rather support the opposite view. For
instance, when required to divide his attention over multiple face
features, LR was able to determine the identity of only a single
feature. Moreover, in a face matching task (Experiment 3, Bukach
et al., 2006), LR was impaired at processing relative distances at
the level of the eyes of a face, and he did not have an inversion
effect in that condition. These results were replicated in a later
study where LR exhibited an impaired ability to discriminate
diagnostic cues in the eye region (Bukach et al., 2008). Similar
observations of a severe impairment at extracting diagnostic
information from the eyes have been made for the patients PS
and GG (Caldara et al., 2005; Orban de Xivry, Ramon, Lefèvre, &
Rossion, 2008; Rossion, Kaiser, Bub, & Tanaka, 2009; Busigny et al.,
2010a) reinforcing the parallel made between the functional
impairment of these patients and LR's impairment in holistic face
perception. According to this view, the eye region loses its
diagnosticity in acquired prosopagnosia because rapidly extracting
diagnostic information from the eye region of a face requires
simultaneous integration of information from multiple sources
(pupils, iris, eyelids, eyebrows, distance between eyes, distance
between eyes and forehead, etc.) (Caldara et al., 2005; Orban de
Xivry et al., 2008; Rossion et al., 2009).
In the large majority of tests of holistic face perception, LR
showed an atypical pattern of performance, and this pattern of
performance was qualitatively similar to previous patients with
pure prosopagnosia following brain damage tested with the same
experiments (i.e., PS and GG). However, contrary to these patients,
LR showed evidence for holistic face perception effects in an
unusual version of the Whole-to-Part Effect (superior performance
for matching parts to parts than parts to wholes). Moreover, even
though LR showed an abnormal performance for misaligned trials
in the composite face paradigm, his composite face effect was still
signiﬁcant. These observations raise the question of whether LR
would be affected at a ﬁner-grained level of holistic perception
than these other patients with prosopagnosia. Indeed, holistic
perception is useful not only to individualize faces, but also to
detect faces, for instance when the parts of the stimulus are not
face-like, as in Mooney faces (Mooney, 1957; Moore & Cavanagh,
1998; McKone, 2004) or Arcimboldo paintings (Hulten, 1987).
However, face detection abilities in these three patients, as tested
with Mooney and Arcimboldo face stimuli, are well preserved (See
Rossion, Dricot, Goebel, & Busigny, 2011 for PS; Busigny et al.,
2010a for GG; supplemental material for LR's data compared
to these two patients’ data). These observations indicate that all
three patients are able to perceive faces holistically at a coarse
2 In a recent study, Bukach et al. (2012) claimed that LR was impaired at
learning exemplars of novel objects (“Greebles”). However, there is currently no
evidence that learning these stimuli requires holistic processing at individuating
members of this category (Robbins & McKone, 2007; Rossion, 2013).
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level – sufﬁcient to categorize a stimulus as a face – but not at the
ﬁnest grained level (i.e. to individualize a face). However, in the
absence of comparative data for other face categorizations (e.g.,
gender, expression, age, etc.) requiring intermediary levels of
holistic representation, we cannot exclude that the patients differ
in terms of the level at which they can process a face holistically.
Speciﬁcally, LR may differ from patients with more posterior brain
damage such as PS and GG in being able to reach a ﬁner-grained
level of holistic representation than these patients. Whether such
observations would be taken as quantitative or qualitative differ-
ences between the functional impairments of the patients would
certainly be a matter of debate, but at this stage the available
evidence as provided here and in our previous studies point only
to quantitative differences between these patients with acquired
prosopagnosia.
4.3. Revisiting the concept of associative prosopagnosia
The term “holistic” has been used by many authors for face
processing, and it may have different meanings in the literature
(e.g., Farah et al., 1998; Maurer et al., 2002; McKone, Martini, &
Nakayama, 2003; Rossion, 2008, 2009, 2013; Tanaka & Farah,
1993). However, it refers undoubtedly to a perceptual process, that
is, the (presumably simultaneous) perceptual integration of the
multiple parts of a face into a single representation. The most
compelling evidence that this is a perceptual process is that it can
be illustrated as a visual illusion, for instance in the well-known
composite face illusion (Young et al., 1987; Rossion & Boremanse,
2008, Rossion, 2013). Hence, if LR is impaired at holistic processing
of faces, this means somehow that he is unable to derive a proper
percept of an individual face. His impaired performance at indivi-
dual face discrimination tasks supports this claim, although most
of the tasks involved a minimal short-term memory component
(delayed matching in experiments 1, 2, 4, 5). LR's impaired
performance at the Benton Face Recognition Test, in which he
had to match simultaneously presented pictures of unfamiliar
faces, further supports the view that he is impaired at perceiving
individual faces.
The observation of a perceptual face impairment in a patient
like LR, whose ventral occipito-temporal cortex up to the anterior
fusiform gyrus appears entirely preserved form brain damage,
challenges the very existence of pure associative forms of proso-
pagnosia, which has been postulated by several authors
(Meadows, 1974; Benton, 1980; Damasio et al., 1982, 1990; De
Renzi, 1986; De Renzi et al., 1991; Barton, 2003). Typically, the
criterion for associative prosopagnosia is precisely that the patient
performs normally at unfamiliar face matching tasks, such as in
the Benton Face Recognition Test (Benton & Van Allen, 1968). For
instance, De Renzi (1986) and De Renzi et al. (1991) claimed that
their brain-damaged patients represented pure forms of associa-
tive prosopagnosia, because they were able to achieve normal
range performance at this test. However, the evidence collected in
these studies was often limited to a single test, with few items, no
control data, and without any measure of response times. For
instance, the patient 4 of De Renzi (1986) presented a score of
21/27 at the short form of the BFRT,3 a score that was judged as
high enough to exclude an impairment of perceptual nature.
Most importantly, there is substantial evidence that even
prosopagnosic patients with clear perceptual impairments can
use idiosyncratic strategies to compensate for their problems in
unfamiliar face matching tasks and are able to reach normal levels
of performance on accuracy scores at these tasks (e.g., Davidoff
et al., 1986; Davidoff & Landis, 1990; Farah, 1990/2004; McNeil &
Warrington, 1991; Sergent & Signoret, 1992a, 1992b; Delvenne
et al., 2004). In these situations, measuring correct RTs, for
instance at BFRT, systematically reveals that the patients are much
slower than all normal controls. This was also the case for LR in the
present study, who sometimes showed a normal performance at
unfamiliar face matching tasks when considering accuracy rates
only (experiments 1, 6 and 7), but who was considerably slowed
down at these tasks relative to controls. Importantly, this slowing
downwas not found for other categories of objects (experiments 1,
2 and 4). Moreover, across all experiments, LR' slowing down
relative to controls was not observed in the most difﬁcult condi-
tions for the controls (inverted faces, similar faces, faces revealed
through a window only) or even in the conditions that were the
most difﬁcult for him in absolute terms (e.g., morphed faces that
were very similar). In all these experiments, the trials of the
different conditions were presented randomly. These observations
exclude an explanation in terms of a general slowing down of the
patient or a lack of conﬁdence. Rather, they show that so-called
cases of associative prosopagnosia can reach normal performance
at a single matching test of unfamiliar faces by abnormal means,
and that a perceptual impairment cannot be excluded without
performing several tests and taking complementary RT measures.
This is particularly the case for measurements of holistic face
perception, because these effects are often revealed in response
times rather than accuracy rates in normal observers (e.g., Young
et al., 1987; see Rossion, 2013).
Besides the lack of stringent testing, there are other reasons
why there is so little evidence of perceptual impairment in
prosopagnosic patients with right anterior temporal lobe damage.
First, cases of prosopagnosia with anterior temporal lesions are
much less frequent than cases with more posterior lesions. Among
about 120 prosopagnosic patients reported in the literature, we
found only 11 patients with a lesion in the right anterior temporal
lobe, while the vast majority of the patients show lesions in the
right fusiform gyrus and in the right inferior occipital gyrus (see
also Bouvier & Engel, 2006). One reason for that is that the
principal etiology of prosopagnosia is an ischemic stroke, speciﬁ-
cally in the territory of the right posterior cerebral artery. By
contrast, lesions of the right anterior temporal lobe are principally
reported in the context of a degenerative disorder, i.e., the right
temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal dementia (e.g., Joubert
et al., 2006; Gainotti, 2007). Most of the time, these patients have
multimodal and multicategorical impairment, preventing them to
recognize faces, but also other categories (e.g., famous places), and
via different modalities (pictures, names, voices,…) (see Gainotti,
2007, 2013; Busigny et al., 2009). In these cases, the nature of the
defect is generally semantic, and the patients cannot be considered
strictly as prosopagnosic, since they do not present with a
recognition defect limited to the visual modality (see Gainotti,
2013). Thus, prosopagnosic patients after a lesion of the anterior
temporal lobe are rare, most patients with this kind of damage
having multimodal person recognition defects. Given that he has
visual impairment in face recognition, but does not have any
difﬁculties in recognizing people from their names and providing
semantic information about them, LR is one of these rare patients.
Nevertheless, these observations on LR are in line with the
description of two cases of prosopagnosia, TS (Barton et al., 2003)
and BD (Williams, Savage, & Halmagyl, 2006), who had damage
restricted to the right anterior temporal lobe and were impaired
at perceiving faces. Interestingly, both of these patients were
3 While such a performance could presumably be equated to a score of 42/54 at
the long form of the test, slightly above a score within the norms, it should be
qualiﬁed because the patients are usually faultless at the ﬁrst 6 items of this test, all
included in the short form, where only one target face has to be found among 6,
without any change of viewing conditions. If these items are excluded, De Renzi
(1986)'s patient had a score of 15/21 (70%) at a single unfamiliar face matching task,
a performance that is insufﬁcient to exclude a perceptual impairment with faces.
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probably impaired at holistic face processing, TS being insensitive
to the global spatial conﬁguration that differs between faces, and
BD having a disrupted composite face effect. Furthermore, a study
of anterior temporal lobectomized patients showed a correlation
between these patients’ face naming impairment and their per-
ceptual discrimination of unfamiliar faces (Glosser et al., 2003).
Together with our results, these observations support the claim
that anterior temporal lobe structures of the right hemipshere play
a role in binding together information relevant to the perceptual
identiﬁcation of unique entities such as individual faces.
To summarize this point, we argue that the apperceptive/
associative distinction used to refer to cases of prosopagnosia is
misleading and should perhaps be abandoned. We hypothesize
that when tested stringently, other cases of prosopagnosia follow-
ing focal brain damage, even those with damage restricted to the
(right) temporal pole, may be impaired at face perception. As
mentioned in the introduction, these observations are in line with
the claim of Farah (1990/2004), that “perception is at fault in all
cases of associative agnosia so far studied” (Farah, 1990/2004, p. 75).
In fact, Lissauer himself qualiﬁed his own distinction between
apperceptive and associative visual agnosia because he noted that
the full perception of complex visual stimuli such as facial ﬁgures
requires an appropriate linkage with stored representations
(Lissauer, 1890; Shallice & Jackson, 1988). Hence, according to this
latter view, the cause of prosopagnosia cannot be strictly divided
into a perceptual vs. a mnesic impairment. The case study
of LR illustrates the difﬁculty of building a proper perceptual
representation of an individual face following damage to neural
structures that are important in linking perceptual and associative
representations.
4.4. The right anterior temporal lobe: a critical node in a face
perception network
Although we must remain careful in the absence of detailed
anatomical and functional data (i.e., (f)MRI)) of the patient LR, our
observations in this patient and the description of other such cases
as mentioned above point to a role of the right anterior temporal
lobe in face perception, and speciﬁcally in holistic perception of
individual faces.
Face perception is supported by an extensive neural network
that encompasses regions of the ventral occipito-temporal path-
way, with a right hemispheric dominance (Sergent et al., 1992;
Haxby et al., 2000; Fox et al., 2009; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2010;
Davies-Thompson & Andrews, 2012; Rossion et al., 2012; Pyles
et al., 2013). This network involves, at least, a face-selective
functional region in the lateral middle fusiform gyrus (called the
“Fusiform Face Area”, “FFA”, Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997;
McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997), another in the lateral
inferior occipital cortex (“Occipital Face Area”, “OFA”, Gauthier
et al., 2000; Rossion et al., 2003) and yet another one in the
posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (Puce, Allison,
Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000;
Hoffman & Haxby, 2000), all three regions being dominant in the
right hemisphere. These regions have been described as the core
face-perceptual network (Haxby et al., 2000), with the FFA and
OFA at least showing clear sensitivity to individual faces discrimi-
nation (e.g., Gauthier et al., 2000; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001;
Schiltz & Rossion, 2006; Andrews, Davies-Thompson, Kingstone, &
Young, 2010).
In this context, what would be the role of the right anterior
temporal lobe in face perception? One possibility is that this
region also plays a direct role in individual face perception, but
that the strong emphasis on the FFA (and to a lesser extent the
OFA), coupled with the presence of strong magnetic susceptibility
artifacts in the anterior temporal lobe (ATL, Devlin et al., 2000;
Bellgowan, Bandettini, van Gelderen, Martin, & Bodurka, 2006),
has hidden its contributing role. Nevertheless, face-speciﬁc activa-
tion has been reported in the human anterior temporal lobe,
particularly in the right hemisphere (e.g., Rajimehr, Young, &
Tootell, 2009; Rossion et al., 2012). Moreover, recent neuroimaging
studies suggested that the right anterior temporal lobe is also
involved in individual face discrimination, even when the stimuli
are not explicitly associated with any biographical or semantic
information (Kriegeskorte, Formisano, Sorger, & Goebel, 2007;
Furl, van Rijsbergen, Treves, & Dolan, 2007; Pinsk et al., 2009).
However, the right ATL has also been described as having a
crucial function in face memory and semantic knowledge about
people (e.g., Gorno-Tempini & Price, 2001; Snowden, Thompson,
& Neary, 2004; Thompson et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2006; Olson,
Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; Drane et al., 2008; Tsukiura, Suzuki,
Shigemune, & Mochizuki-Kawai, 2008; Simmons, Reddish, Bellgowan,
& Martin, 2010). Hence, along the lines of Lissauer (1890)'s
insightful view, one may also consider that this region plays a role
in the storage, consolidation and linking of perceptual representa-
tions, and that such dynamic associations are necessary to achieve
a fully reﬁned perceptual representation of an individual face.
That is, rather than seeing the perceptual impairment as being
causal, one would see it the other way around: damage to areas
primarily involved in associative memory could cause a defect
in face perception. These observations are in line with the
Emergent Memory Account (EMA; Barense, Gaffan, & Graham,
2007; Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010), which suggests that percep-
tion and memory depend on an overlapping network of wide-
spread representations, and that memory is the outcome of a
dynamic interplay between hierarchically organized perceptual
representations distributed throughout the brain. This complex
entanglement between perception and memory implies that the
way we perceive visually is inﬂuenced by our stored representa-
tions. In other words, complex (multidimensional) percepts
emerge from the automatic associations of simple, non category-
speciﬁc representations, through the matching with internal
holistic representations. Considering this, in the case of LR for
instance, a lesion in the anterior temporal lobe appears to have
negative effects on perceptual processing of faces, suggesting that
the right anterior temporal cortex plays a crucial role in the
interplay between memory and perception of faces.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, we report a case of prosopagnosia following
right anterior temporal damage who is speciﬁcally impaired with
the holistic perception of individual faces. Taken together with
results obtained from other cases of acquired prosopagnosia, these
observations suggest that complex (multidimensional) face per-
cepts emerge from the automatic associations of simple, non
category-speciﬁc representations, through the matching with
internal face representations. A crucial process involved at that
level is the holistic/conﬁgural perception of individual faces. An
individual face can be fully perceived as a single entity only if it
can be successfully associated with an internal holistic face
representation. This process may be successfully completed only
if a whole network of posterior and anterior cerebral regions is
functionally intact. In this framework, the notion of pure associa-
tive prosopagnosia, namely, a patient impaired at face recognition
who would be able to derive a correct percept of a face, should be
reconsidered. At the functional level, although the degree of
severity of the face recognition impairment and the kind of
associated deﬁcits can greatly vary among patients, our ﬁndings
raise the possibility that there is a single form of acquired
prosopagnosia.
T. Busigny et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 312–333330
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to LR for the numerous hours that he spent
performing these experiments, as well as to his spouse and all the
controls who took part in the study. We also thank Dan Bub and
Jim Tanaka for having introduced us to LR, and for their help and
their relevant comments about this study. We thank Jayalakshmi
Viswanathan, Talia Retter and two anonymous reviewers for their
commentaries and corrections on a previous version of the manu-
script. This research was supported by the Belgian National Fund
for Scientiﬁc Research (FRSM 3.4601.12) and a PAI/UIAP grant no
P7/33 (Pôles d'attraction interuniversitaires, phase 7).
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2014.01.018.
References
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from visual cues: Role
of the STS region. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 267–278.
Allison, T., Puce, A., Spencer, D. D., & McCarthy, G. (1999). Electrophysiological
studies of human face perception. I: Potentials generated in occipitotemporal
cortex by face and non-face stimuli. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 415–430.
Andrews, T. J., Davies-Thompson, J., Kingstone, A., & Young, A. W. (2010). Internal
and external features of the face are represented holistically in face-selective
regions of visual cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(9), 3544–3552.
Armitage, P. (1980). Statistical methods in medical research. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Scientiﬁc Publications.
Barbarotto, R., Capitani, E., Spinnler, H., & Trivelli, C. (1995). Slowly progressive
semantic impairment with category speciﬁcity. Neurocase, 1, 107–119.
Barense, M. D., Gaffan, D., & Graham, K. S. (2007). The medial temporal lobe
processes online representations of complex objects. Neuropsychologia, 45,
2963–2974.
Barton, J. J. S. (2003). Disorders of face perception and recognition. Neurologic
Clinics, 21(2), 521–548.
Barton, J. J. S. (2008). Structure and function in acquired prosopagnosia: Lessons
from a series of 10 patients with brain damage. Journal of Neuropsychology, 2,
197–225.
Barton, J. J. S., Cherkasova, M. V., & Hefter, R. (2004). The covert priming effect of
faces in prosopagnosia. Neurology, 63(11), 2062–2068.
Barton, J. J. S., Hanif, H., & Ashraf, S. (2009). Relating visual to verbal semantic
knowledge: The evaluation of object recognition in prosopagnosia. Brain, 132,
3456–3466.
Barton, J. J. S., Press, D. Z., Keenan, J. P., & O’Connor, M. (2002). Lesions of the
fusiform face area impair perception of facial conﬁguration in prosopagnosia.
Neurology, 58, 71–78.
Barton, J. J. S., Zhao, J., & Keenan, J. P. (2003). Perception of global facial geometry in
the inversion effect and prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1703–1711.
Bellgowan, P. S., Bandettini, P. A., van Gelderen, P., Martin, A., & Bodurka, J. (2006).
Improved BOLD detection in the medial temporal region using parallel imaging
and voxel volume reduction. Neuroimage, 29(4), 1244–1251.
Benton, A. L. (1980). The neuropsychology of facial recognition. The American
Psychologist, 35(2), 176–186.
Benton, A. L., & Van Allen, M. W. (1968). Impairment in facial recognition in patients
with cerebral disease. Transactions of the American Neurological Association, 93,
38–42.
Blanz, V., & Vetter, T., (1999). A morphable model for the synthesis of 3D faces. In
Proceedings of the 26th annual conference on computer graphics and interactive
techniques (pp. 187–194). New York, USA: ACM Press/Addison-Wesley Publish-
ing Co.
Boutsen, L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2002). Face context interferes with local part
processing in a prosopagnosic patient. Neuropsychologia, 40, 2305–2313.
Bouvier, S. E., & Engel, S. A. (2006). Behavioral deﬁcits and cortical damage loci in
cerebral achromatopsia. Cerebral Cortex, 16(2), 183–191.
Bowers, D., Blonder, L., & Heilman, K. M. (1991). The Florida affect battery. Gainesville,
FL: Center for Neuropsychological Studies, University of Florida.
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of
Psychology, 77, 305–327.
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (2012). Face perception. Hove: Psychology Press.
Bukach, C., Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Kadlec, H., Barth, S., Ryan, E., et al. (2012). Does
acquisition of Greeble expertise in prosopagnosia rule out a domain-general
deﬁcit? Neuropsychologia, 50(2), 289–304.
Bukach, C., Le Grand, R., Kaiser, M., Bub, D., & Tanaka, J. W. (2008). Preservation of
mouth region processing in two cases of prosopagnosia. Journal of Neuropsy-
chology, 2, 227–244.
Bukach, C. M., Bub, D. N., Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (2006). Perceptual expertise
effects are not all or none: Spatially limited perceptual expertise for faces in a
case of prosopagnosia. Journal of Cognitive Neurosciences, 18(1), 48–63.
Busigny, T., Graf, M., Mayer, E., & Rossion, B. (2010). Acquired prosopagnosia as a
face-speciﬁc disorder: Ruling out the general visual similarity account. Neu-
ropsychologia, 48, 2051–2067.
Busigny, T., Joubert, S., Felician, O., Ceccaldi, M., & Rossion, B. (2010). Holistic
perception of the individual face is speciﬁc and necessary: evidence from an
extensive case study of acquired prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 48,
4057–4092.
Busigny, T., Robaye, L., Dricot, L., & Rossion, B (2009). Right anterior temporal lobe
atrophy and person-based semantic defect: A detailed case study. Neurocase, 15
(6), 485–508.
Busigny, T., & Rossion, B. (2010a). Acquired prosopagnosia abolishes the face
inversion effect. Cortex, 46, 965–981.
Busigny, T., & Rossion, B. (2010b). Acquired prosopagnosia is not due to a general
impairment in ﬁne-grained recognition of exemplars of a visually homoge-
neous category. Behavioural Neurology, 23, 229–231.
Caldara, R., Schyns, P., Mayer, E., Smith, M. L., Gosselin, F., & Rossion, B. (2005). Does
prosopagnosia take the eyes out from faces? Evidence for a defect in the use of
diagnostic facial information in a brain-damaged patient. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 17, 1652–1666.
Calder, A. J., Rhodes, G., Johnson, M., & Haxby, J. V. (2011). The oxford handbook of
face perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chiaravalloti, N. D., & Glosser, G. (2004). Memory for faces dissociates from memory
for location following anterior temporal lobectomy. Brain and Cognition, 54,
35–42.
Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2002). Investigation of the single case in
neuropsychology: Conﬁdence limits on the abnormality of test scores and test
score differences. Neuropsychologia, 40, 1196–1208.
Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2005). Testing for suspected impairments and
dissociations in single-case studies in neuropsychology: Evaluation of alter-
natives using Monte Carlo simulations and revised tests for dissociations.
Neuropsychology, 19, 318–331.
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an individual's test score against
norms derived from small samples. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 12(4),
482–486.
Dalrymple, K. A., Oruç, I., Duchaine, B., Pancaroglu, R., Fox, C. J., Iaria, G., et al. (2011).
The anatomic basis of the right face-selective N170 in acquired prosopagnosia:
A combined ERP/fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 49(9), 2553–2563.
Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Van Hoesen, G. W. (1982). Prosopagnosia: Anatomic
basis and behavioural mechanisms. Neurology, 32, 331–341.
Damasio, A. R., Tranel., D., & Damasio, H. (1990). Face agnosia and the neural
substrates of memory. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 89–109.
Davidoff, J., & Landis, T. (1990). Recognition of unfamiliar faces in prosopagnosia.
Neuropsychologia, 28(11), 1143–1161.
Davidoff, J., Matthews, B., & Newcombe, F. (1986). Observations on a case of
prosopagnosia. In: H. Ellis, M. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.), Aspects of
face processing (pp. 279–290). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Davies-Thompson, J., & Andrews, T. J. (2012). Intra- and interhemispheric con-
nectivity between face-selective regions in the human brain. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 108, 3087–3095.
De Renzi, E. (1986). Current issues on prosopagnosia. In: H. D. Ellis, M. A. Jeeves,
F. Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.), Aspects of face processing (pp. 243–252).
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
De Renzi, E., Faglioni, P., Grossi, D., & Nichelli, P. (1991). Apperceptive and
associative forms of prosopagnosia. Cortex, 27(2), 213–221.
Delvenne, J.-F., Seron, X., Coyette, F., & Rossion, B. (2004). Evidence for perceptual
deﬁcits in associative visual (prosop)agnosia: A single-case study. Neuropsy-
chologia, 42, 597–612.
Devlin, J. T., Russell, R. P., Davis, M. H., Price, C. J., Wilson, J., Moss, HE, et al. (2000).
Susceptibility-induced loss of signal: comparing PET and fMRI on a semantic
task. Neuroimage, 11, 589–600.
Drane, D. L., Ojemann, G. A., Aylward, E., Ojemann, J. G., Johnson, L. C., Silbergeld, D.
L., et al. (2008). Category-speciﬁc naming and recognition deﬁcits in temporal
lobe epilepsy surgical patients. Neuropsychologia, 46(5), 1242–1255.
Duchaine, B. C., & Nakayama, K. (2006). The Cambridge Face Memory Test: Results
for neurologically intact individuals and an investigation of its validity using
inverted face stimuli and prosopagnosic participants. Neuropsychologia, 44,
576–585.
Duchaine, B. C., Germine, L., & Nakayama, K. (2007). Family resemblance: Ten family
members with prosopagnosia and within-class object agnosia. Cognitive Neu-
ropsychology, 24(4), 419–430.
Ellis, A. W., Young, A. W., & Critchley, E. M. (1989). Loss of memory for people
following temporal lobe damage. Brain, 112, 1469–1483.
Evans, J. J., Heggs, A. J., Antoun, N., & Hodges, J. R. (1995). Progressive prosopagnosia
associated with selective right temporal lobe atrophy. A new syndrome? Brain,
118(1), 1–13.
Farah, M. J. (1990/2004). Visual agnosia: Disorders of object recognition and what they
tell us about normal vision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, H. M., & Tanaka, J. R. (1995). The inverted face
inversion effect in prosopagnosia: Evidence for mandatory, face-speciﬁc per-
ceptual mechanisms. Vision Research, 35(14), 2089–2093.
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, H. M., & Tanaka, J. R. (1998). What is “special” about
face perception? Psychological Review, 105, 482–498.
T. Busigny et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 312–333 331
Faust, C. (1955). Evaluation of posttraumatic organic personality disorders. Deutsche
Medizinische Wochenschrift, 80, 1237–1239.
Fox, C. J., Iaria, G., & Barton, J. J. (2009). Deﬁning the face processing network:
optimization of the functional localizer in fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 30(5),
1637–1651.
Furl, N., van Rijsbergen, N. J., Treves, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2007). Face adaptation
aftereffects reveal anterior medial temporal cortex role in high level category
representation. Neuroimage, 37(1), 300–310.
Gainotti, G. (2007). Different patterns of famous people recognition disorders in
patients with right and left anterior temporal lesions: A systematic review.
Neuropsychologia, 45, 1591–1607.
Gainotti, G. (2013). Is the right anterior temporal variant of prosopagnosia a form of
‘associative prosopagnosia’ or a form of ‘multimodal person recognition
disorder’? Neuropsycholy Review, 23(2), 99–110.
Gainotti, G., Barbier, A., & Marra, C. (2003). Slowly progressive defect in recognition
of familiar people in a patient with right anterior temporal atrophy. Brain, 126,
792–803.
Gainotti, G., Ferraccioli, M., Quaranta, D., & Marra, C. (2008). Cross-modal recogni-
tion disorders for persons and other unique entities in a patient with right
fronto-temporal degeneration. Cortex, 44, 238–248.
Gauthier, I., Behrmann, M., & Tarr, M. J. (1999). Can face recognition really be
dissociated from object recognition? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 11(4),
349–370.
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Moylan, J., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000).
The fusiform “face area” is part of a network that processes faces at the
individual level. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 495–504.
Gentileschi, V., Sperber, S., & Spinnler, H. (1999). Progressive defective recognition
of familiar people. Neurocase, 5, 407–424.
Gentileschi, V., Sperber, S., & Spinnler, H. (2001). Crossmodal agnosia for familiar
people as a consequence of right infero-polar temporal atrophy. Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 18(5), 439–463.
Glosser, G., Salvucci, A. E., & Chiaravalloti, N. D. (2003). Naming and recognizing
famous faces in temporal lobe epilepsy. Neurology, 61(1), 81–86.
Gobbini, M. I., & Haxby, J. V. (2007). Neural systems for recognition of familiar faces.
Neuropsychologia, 45(1), 32–41.
Goffaux, V., & Rossion, B. (2006). Faces are “spatial” – Holistic face perception is
supported by low spatial frequencies. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 32(4), 1023–1039.
Gorno-Tempini, M. L., & Price, C. J. (2001). Identiﬁcation of famous faces and
buildings: a functional neuroimaging study of semantically unique items. Brain,
124(10), 2087–2097.
Gorno-Tempini, M. L., Rankin, K. P., Woolley, J. D., Rosen, H. J., Phengrasamy, L., &
Miller, B. L. (2004). Cognitive and behavioural proﬁle in a case of right anterior
temporal lobe neurodegeneration. Cortex, 40, 631–644.
Graham, K. S., Barense, M. D., & Lee, A. C. H. (2010). Going beyond LTM in the MLT: A
synthesis of neuropsychological and neuroimaging ﬁndings on the role of the
medial temporal lobe in memory and perception. Neuropsychologia, 48, 831–853.
Grill-Spector, K., & Malach, R. (2001). fMR-adaptation: A tool for studying the
functional properties of human cortical neurons. Acta Psychologica, 107(1–3),
293–321.
Gross, C. G., & Sergent, J. (1992). Face recognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology,
2, 156–161.
Hanley, J. R., Young, A. W., & Pearson, N. A. (1989). Defective recognition of familiar
people. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6(2), 179–210.
Haslam, C., Cook, M., & Coltheart, M. (2001). ‘I know your name but not your face’:
Explaining modality-based differences in access to biographical knowledge in a
patient with retrograde amnesia. Neurocase, 7, 189–199.
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural
system for face perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 223–233.
Hoffman, E., & Haxby, J. (2000). Distinct representations of eye gaze and identity in
the distributed human neural system for face perception. Nature Neuroscience,
3, 80–84.
Hole, G. J. (1994). Conﬁgural factors in the perception of unfamiliar faces.
Perception, 23(1), 65–74.
Hulten, P. (1987). The arcimboldo effect. London: Thames & Hudson.
Joubert, S., Felician, O., Barbeau, E., Ranjeva, J. P., Christophe, M., Didic, M., et al.
(2006). The right temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal dementia: Cognitive
and neuroanatomical proﬁle of three patients. Journal of Neurology, 253(11),
1447–1458.
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A module
in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 17, 4302–4311.
Kapur, N., Ellison, D., Smith, M. P., McLellan, D. L., & Burrows, E. H. (1992). Focal
retrograde amnesia following bilateral temporal lobe pathology. Brain, 115,
73–85.
Kriegeskorte, N., Formisano, E., Sorger, B., & Goebel, R. (2007). Individual faces elicit
distinct response patterns in human anterior temporal cortex. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104(51),
20600–20605.
Le Grand, R., Mondloch, C. J., Maurer, D., & Brent, H. P. (2004). Impairment in
holistic face processing following early visual deprivation. Psychological Science,
15, 762–768.
Leder, H., & Carbon, C. C. (2005). When context hinders! Learn-test compatibility in
face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human
Experimental Psychology, 58, 235–250.
Leder, H., & Carbon, C. C. (2006). Face-speciﬁc conﬁgural processing of relational
information. British Journal of Psychology, 97, 19–29.
Levine, D. N., & Calvanio, R. (1989). Prosopagnosia: A defect in visual conﬁgural
processing. Brain and Cognition, 10, 149–170.
Lissauer, H. (1890). Ein fall von seelenblindheit nebst einem beitrage zur theorie
derselben [English translation by Shallice, T., & Jackson, M. (1988). Lissauer
on agnosia]. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 5, 153–192(Archiv für Psychiatrie, 21,
222–270).
Lundqvist, D., Flykt, A., & Ohman, A. (1998). The Karolinska directed emotional faces.
Sweden: The Karolinska Institute.
Marotta, J. J., McKeeff, T. J., & Behrmann, M. (2002). The effects of rotation and
inversion on face processing in prosopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 19
(1), 31–47.
Mattson, A. J., Levin, H. S., & Grafman, J. (2000). A case of prosopagnosia following
moderate closed head injury with left hemisphere focal lesion. Cortex, 36,
125–137.
Maurer, D., Le Grand, R., & Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many faces of conﬁgural
processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 255–260.
McCarthy, G., Puce, A., Gore, J. C., & Allison, T. (1997). Face-speciﬁc processing in the
human fusiform gyrus. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 605–610.
McKone, E. (2004). Isolating the special component of face recognition, peripheral
identiﬁcation and a Mooney face. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 30, 181–197.
McKone, E., Martini, P., & Nakayama, K. (2003). Isolating holistic processing in faces
(and perhaps objects). In: M. Peterson, & G. Rhodes (Eds.), Perception of Faces,
Objects, and Scenes: Analytic and Holistic Processes (pp. 92–119). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
McNeil, J. E., & Warrington, E. K. (1991). Prosopagnosia: A reclassiﬁcation. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A, 43(2), 267–287.
Meadows, J. C. (1974). The anatomical basis of prosopagnosia. Journal of Neurology,
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 37, 489–501.
Michel, C., Caldara, R., & Rossion, B. (2006a). Same-race faces are perceived more
holistically than other-race faces. Visual Cognition, 14(1), 55–73.
Michel, C., Rossion, B., Han, J., Chung, C-S., & Caldara, R. (2006b). Holistic
processinsg is ﬁnely tuned for faces of our own race. Psychological Science, 17,
608–615.
Mooney, C. M. (1957). Age in the development of closure ability in children.
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 11, 219–226.
Moore, C., & Cavanagh, P. (1998). Recovery of 3D volume from 2-tone images of
novel objects. Cognition, 67, 45–71.
Newcombe, F. (1979). The processing of visual information in prosopagnosia and
acquired dyslexia: Functional versus physiological interpretation. In: D.
J. Oborne, M. M. Gruneberg, & J. R. Eiser (Eds.), Research in psychology and
medecine, Vol 1). London: Academic Press.
Olson, I. R., Plotzker, A., & Ezzyat, Y. (2007). The enigmatic temporal pole: A review
of ﬁndings on social and emotional processing. Brain, 130, 1718–1731.
Orban de Xivry, J. J., Ramon, M., Lefèvre, P., & Rossion, B. (2008). Reduced ﬁxation of
the eyes area of personally familiar faces following acquired prosopagnosia.
Journal of Neuropsychology, 2, 245–268.
Pancaroglu, R., Busigny, T., Johnston, S., Sekunova, A., Duchaine, B., & Barton, J. J. S.
(2011). The right anterior temporal lobe variant of prosopagnosia. Journal of
Vision, 11(11), 573.
Pancaroglu, R., Johnston, S., Sekunova, A., Duchaine, B., & Barton, J. J. S. (2012).
Prosopagnosia following epilepsy surgery: What you see is not all they have.
Journal of Vision, 12(9), 489.
Pinsk, M. A., Arcaro, M., Weiner, K. S., Kalkus, J. F., Inati, S. J., Gross, C. G., et al.
(2009). Neural representations of faces and body parts in macaque and human
cortex: A comparative fMRI study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 101(5),
2581–2600.
Puce, A., Allison, T., Bentin, S., Gore, J. C., & McCarthy, G. (1998). Temporal cortex
activation in humans viewing eye and mouth movements. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 18, 2188–2199.
Pyles, J. A., Verstynen, T. D., Schneider, W., & Tarr, M. J. (2013). Explicating the face
perception network with white matter connectivity. PLoS One, 8(4), e61611.
Rajimehr, R., Young, J. C., & Tootell, R. B. (2009). An anterior temporal face patch in
human cortex, predicted by macaque maps. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(6), 1995–2000.
Ramon, M., Busigny, T., & Rossion, B. (2010). Impaired holistic processing of
unfamiliar individual faces in acquired prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 48
(4), 933–944.
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years
of research. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 372–422.
Riddoch, M. J., Johnston, R. A., Bracewell, R. M., Boutsen, L., & Humphreys, G. W.
(2008). Are faces special? A case of pure prosopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsy-
chology, 25(1), 3–26.
Robbins, R., & McKone, E. (2007). No face-like processing for objects-of-expertise in
three behavioural tasks. Cognition, 103, 34–79.
Rogers, T. T., Hocking, J., Noppeney, U., Mechelli, A., Gorno-Tempini, M. L., Patterson,
K., et al. (2006). Anterior temporal cortex and semantic memory: reconciling
ﬁndings from neuropsychology and functional imaging. Cognitive, Affective, and
Behavioural Neuroscience, 6(3), 201–213.
Rossion, B. (2008). Picture-plane inversion leads to qualitative changes of face
perception. Acta Psychologica, 128, 274–289.
Rossion, B. (2009). Distinguishing the cause and consequence of face inversion: the
perceptual ﬁeld hypothesis. Acta Psychologica, 132, 300–312.
T. Busigny et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 312–333332
Rossion, B. (2013). The composite face illusion: A whole window into our under-
standing of holistic face perception. Visual Cognition, 21(2), 139–253.
Rossion, B., & Boremanse, A. (2008). Nonlinear relationship between holistic
processing of individual faces and picture-plane rotation: Evidence from the
face composite illusion. Journal of Vision, 8, 1–13.
Rossion, B., Caldara, R., Seghier, M., Schuller, A.-M., Lazeyras, F., & Mayer, E. (2003).
A network of occipito-temporal face-sensitive areas besides the right middle
fusiform gyrus is necessary for normal face processing. Brain, 126, 2381–2395.
Rossion, B., & Curran, T. (2010). Visual expertise with pictures of cars correlates with
RT magnitude of the car inversion effect. Perception, 39(2), 173–183.
Rossion, B., Dricot, L., Goebel, R., & Busigny, T. (2011). Holistic face categorization in
higher-level cortical visual areas of the normal and prosopagnosic brain:
Towards a non-hierarchical view of face perception. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 4, 225, http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00225.
Rossion, B., Hanseeuw, B., & Dricot, L. (2012). Deﬁning face perception areas in the
human brain: A large-scale factorial fMRI face localizer analysis. Brain and
Cognition, 79(2), 138–157.
Rossion, B., Kaiser, M. D., Bub, D., & Tanaka, J. W. (2009). Is the loss of diagnosticity
of the eye region of the face a common aspect of acquired prosopagnosia?
Journal of Neuropsychology, 3, 69–78.
Saumier, D., Arguin, M., & Lassonde, M. (2001). Prosopagnosia: A case study
involving problems in processing conﬁgurale information. Brain and Cognition,
46, 255–316.
Scapinello, K. F., & Yarmey, A. D. (1970). The role of familiarity and orientation in
immediate and delayed recognition of pictorial stimuli. Psychonomic Science, 21,
329–331.
Schiltz, C., & Rossion, B. (2006). Faces are represented holistically in the human
occipito-temporal cortex. Neuroimage, 32(3), 1385–1394.
Schiltz, C., Sorger, B., Caldara, R., Ahmed, F., Mayer, E., Goebel, R., et al. (2006).
Impaired face discrimination in acquired prosopagnosia is associated with
abnormal response to individual faces in the right middle fusiform gyrus.
Cerebral Cortex, 16, 574–586.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-prime reference guide.
Pittsburgh: Psychology Software Tools Inc.
Schweich, M., & Bruyer, R. (1993). Heterogeneity in the cognitive manifestations of
prosopagnosia: The study of a group of single cases. Cognitive Neuropsychology,
10, 529–547.
Sergent, J., Otha, S., & MacDonald, B. (1992). Functional neuroanatomy of face and
object processing. A positron emission tomography study. Brain, 115, 15–36.
Sergent, J., & Poncet, M. (1990). From covert to overt recognition of faces in a
prosopagnosic patient. Brain, 113(4), 989–1004.
Sergent, J., & Signoret, J.-L. (1992a). Varieties of functional deﬁcits in prosopagnosia.
Cerebral Cortex, 2, 375–388.
Sergent, J., & Signoret, J.-L. (1992b). Functional and anatomical decomposition of
face processing: Evidence from prosopagnosia and PET study of normal
subjects. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Serie B, 335,
55–62.
Sergent, J., & Villemure, J. G. (1989). Prosopagnosia in a right hemispherectomized
patient. Brain, 112(4), 975–995.
Shallice, T., & Jackson, M. (1988). Lissauer on agnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 5,
153–192.
Simmons, W. K., Reddish, M., Bellgowan, P. S., & Martin, A. (2010). The selectivity
and functional connectivity of the anterior temporal lobes. Cerebral Cortex, 20
(4), 813–825.
Snowden, J. S., Thompson, J. C., & Neary, D. (2004). Knowledge of famous faces and
names in semantic dementia. Brain, 127, 860–872.
Sorger, B., Goebel, R., Schiltz, C., & Rossion, B. (2007). Understanding the functional
neuroanatomy of prosopagnosia. NeuroImage, 35, 856–862.
Spillmann, L., Laskowski, W., Lange, K. W., Kasper, E., & Schmidt, D. (2000). Stroke-
blind for colors, faces and locations: Partial recovery after three years.
Restorative Neurology and Neuroscience, 17, 89–103.
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A(2), 225–245.
Thompson, S. A., Graham, K. S., Williams, G., Patterson, K., Kapur, N., & Hodges, J. R.
(2004). Dissociating person-speciﬁc from general semantic knowledge: Roles of
the left and right temporal lobes. Neuropsychologia, 42, 359–370.
Tippett, L. J., Miller, L. A., & Farah, M. J. (2000). Prosopamnesia: A selective
impairment in face learning. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17, 241–255.
Townsend, J. T., & Ashby, F. G. (1983). Stochastic modelling of elementary psycholo-
gical processes. London: Cambridge University Press.
Tsukiura, T., Suzuki, C., Shigemune, Y., & Mochizuki-Kawai, H. (2008). Differential
contributions of the anterior temporal and medial temporal lobe to the
retrieval of memory for person identity information. Human Brain Mapping,
29(12), 1343–1354.
Tyrrell, P. J., Warrington, E. K., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Rossor, M. N. (1990). Progressive
degeneration of the right temporal lobe studied with positron emission
tomography. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 53, 1046–1050.
Valentine, T., & Bruce, V. (1986). The effect of race, inversion and encoding activity
upon face recognition. Acta Psychologica, 61, 259–273.
Van Belle, G., Busigny, T., Lefèvre, P., Joubert, S., Felician, O, Gentile, F., et al. (2011).
Impairment of holistic face perception following right occipito-temporal
damage in prosopagnosia: converging evidence from gaze-contingency. Neu-
ropsychologia, 49(11), 3145–3150.
Van Belle, G., de Graef, P., Verfaillie, K., Busigny, T., & Rossion, B. (2010a). Whole not
hole: Expert face recognition requires holistic perception. Neuropsychologia, 48,
2609–2620.
Van Belle, G., de Graef, P., Verfaillie, K., Rossion, B., & Lefèvre, P. (2010b). Face
inversion impairs holistic perception: Evidence from gaze-contingent stimula-
tion. Journal of Vision., 10(5), 1–13.
Warrington, E. K. (1984). Recognition memory test. Windsor, Berkshire: NFER.
Warrington, E. K., & McCarthy, R. A. (1988). The fractionation of retrograde amnesia.
Brain and Cognition, 7, 184–200.
Weiner, K. S., & Grill-Spector, K. (2010). Sparsely-distributed organization of face
and limb activations in human ventral temporal cortex. Neuroimage, 52(4),
1559–1573.
Wilkinson, D., Ko, P., Wiriadjaja, A., Kilduff, P., McGlinchey, R., & Milberg, W. (2009).
Unilateral damage to the right cerebral hemisphere disrupts the apprehension
of whole faces and their component parts. Neuropsychologia, 47, 1701–1711.
Williams, M. A., Savage, G., & Halmagyl, M. (2006). Abnormal conﬁgural face
perception in a patient with right anterior temporal lobe atrophy. Neurocase,
12, 286–291.
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
81, 141–145.
Young, A. W., Flude, B. M., Hay, D. C., & Ellis, A. W. (1993). Impaired discrimination
of familiar from unfamiliar faces. Cortex, 29, 65–75.
Young, A. W., Hellawell, D., & Hay, D. C. (1987). Conﬁgural information in face
perception. Perception, 16, 747–759.
T. Busigny et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 312–333 333
